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There is currently no single document that aids a Joint Task
Force Commander or their staff in understanding the complexities of
Anitair Warfar (AAW) during amphibious operations by maritime
forces. Historically, the Navy has been concerned with the Outer
Air Battle. This involves vast distances over the ocean, but does
not cover amphibious operations. With the down sizing of the U.S.
military as a result of an end to the "Cold War", there will be
fewer overseas bases and assets to conduct contingency
amphibious operations. The authors review the current and future
concepts and doctrine, Command, Control, and Communications, and
weapon systems of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps for AAW during
amphibious operations. The authors propose that the Amphibious
Defense Zone Coordinator (ADZC) paradigm be accepted so that an
integrated air defense of the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) and
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This paper will bring to light some of the Command,
Control and Communications (C3 ) problems in Antiair Warfare
(AAW) during amphibious operations by the United States Navy
(USN) and Marine Corps. The AAW doctrine for the USN since
the end of World War II (WW II) has been oriented towards the
defense of the Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) . The current
version of this doctrine is known as the Outer Air Battle
(OAB) . The OAB doctrine provides for tactics and procedures
that provide a layered defense emanating from the carrier and
her escorts out to approximately 500 nm. This doctrine was
designed specifically to defeat attack by large numbers of
Antiship Missile (ASM) carrying bombers of the Soviet Union.
With the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990' s and the
break up of its armed forces to the various independent states
formed from the former Soviet Union, the threat that this
doctrine was created for no longer exists.
The threat of third world disorder and possible armed
conflicts arising from these corners of the world appear to be
taking a much more important role in adversely affecting our
national interests. Although conflicts of this nature have
been of a continuing nature since WW II, they seem to have
always been overcome by the threat of the Soviet Union and her
capabilities to wage war. As a result, the Navy and Marine
Corps have developed a doctrine that counters the various
threats of the Soviet Union assuming that it would also be
capable of countering third world threats by default. A brief
look at the past 13 years leads to debate whether that
assumption is true or not.
• 1979 Iran hostages (Operation EAGLE CLAW)
• 1983 Grenada (Operation URGENT FURY)
• 1986 Libya (Operation ELDORADO CANYON)
• 1988 Persian Gulf (Operation PRAYING MANTIS)
• 1989 Panama (Operation JUST CAUSE)
• 1990 Iraq (Operations DESERT SHIELD)
• 1991 Iraq (Operation DESERT STORM)
If one were to include all the Non-combatant Evacuation
Operations (NEOs) conducted by the Navy and Marines during the
same period, the list would be appreciably longer. "A
historical analysis of the facts shows that, of over 200
regional crises that naval forces responded to between 1945
and 1989, only 18 directly involved the Soviets" [Ref. l:p.
13]
The procedures for conducting an amphibious operation have
been well established since WW II. The purpose of this thesis
is to provide its readers a basic understanding of the
complexity of joint Navy and Marine Corps AAW in support of
amphibious operations.
This thesis will cover the basic principles of planning
and conducting an amphibious operation; discuss the current
and possible future doctrine and procedures for providing the
air defense of an amphibious force; describe in detail current
and future Command, Control and Communication (C3 ) systems
that could conduct the air battle; describe the capabilities
of current and future weapon systems for AAW in amphibious
operations; and finally provide the authors' recommendations
and conclusions on conducting AAW during amphibious
operations.
Two proposals have been made to change amphibious doctrine
to obtain a more integrated Battle Force. Commander Third
Fleet (COMTHIRDFLT) proposes making the Commander Amphibious
Task Force (CATF) a separate warfare commander under the
Of ficer-in-Tactical Command (OTC) so as to integrate the
Battle Force into a single Composite Warfare Commander (CWC)
organization. Commander Surface Warfare Development Group
(CSWDG) proposes combining the functions of the CATF ' s and
Carrier Battle Group's (CVBG's) Antiair Warfare Commanders
(AAWCs) into a an single integrated organization. The authors
propose that the Amphibious Defense Zone Coordinator (ADZC)
paradigm be accepted so that an integrated air defense of the
Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) and the CVBG are treated as
subsets of the same overall AAW plan.
B. ORGANIZATION
The thesis is organized into chapters that discuss or
analyze a specific aspect of AAW. Chapter I serves as an
introduction providing a background.
Chapter II serves as a prelude into the subject of AAW by
defining terms, processes and command relationships associated
with AAW. A clear understanding of these definitions
facilitates the discussion of AAW during amphibious
operations.
Chapter III discusses the present way the Navy and Marine
Corps conduct AAW in support of amphibious operations. It
starts off by defining the various Commanders in Chief. The
present Navy and Marine Corps command organization, including
a description of each subordinate commander and his function,
is discussed. This is done in order to highlight the
principal players and their interrelationships during the
conduct of AAW in support of amphibious operations. The
present doctrine in the form of AAW principles is discussed
separately for both the Navy and Marine Corps. This is done
in order to review the present doctrine for each service and
possibly expose any major deficiencies or differences when
conducting AAW in support of amphibious operations.
Chapter IV discusses the current Command, Control, and
Communication (C3 ) systems that are presently in use by the
Navy and Marine Corps. A brief description of the major C3
systems employed by each service is provided. This highlights
system capabilities and exposes interoperability issues.
Chapter V provides the current weapon systems that are
available to the Navy and Marine Corps that could be employed
to conduct AAW in support of amphibious operations. This is
done in order to expose weapon systems capabilities and
vulnerabilities. It is hoped that this information may aid a
commander in effectively integrating all his AAW assets and
best employ them by exploiting their capabilities and
minimizing their limitations.
Chapter VI discusses future concepts and doctrine. There
are several doctrinal changes that are being proposed for
future operations. These proposals are reviewed in order to
compare them to present doctrine and to provide an evaluation
as to whether they are viable principles to be integrated into
future operations.
Chapter VII discusses future C3 systems. This will
provide insight into future C3 capabilities and limitations of
the Navy and Marine Corps.
Chapter VIII provides a description of future weapon
systems that may be employed in the conduct of AAW during
amphibious operations. The chapter focuses on systems that
have been started in the weapons procurement cycle and ones
which the authors feel will be continued and available in the
near future. Existing systems and their enhanced capabilities
are highlighted.




As with any military operation that is to be successful,
there must be clear lines of commando However, with the US
military there are several different levels of command. The
ultimate military commander in the US is the President. He is
supported in this area of responsibility by the Secretary of
Defense. Together, they are known as the National Command
Authorities (NCA) . Since it is impossible for them to be
everywhere at once, there are specific procedures to establish
a clear line of command from the military operation back to
the NCA. [Ref. 2:pp. 51-52]
1. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) assist the NCA in
exercising direction over the Unified and Specified Commands
(USCs) . This assistance is to a degree determined by the NCA.
One of the ways the JCS assists is by publishing joint
publications. These publications set forth principles,
doctrines, and military guidance to govern the joint
activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the US [Ref.
3:p. 1]. As a result, the JCS has produced several
definitions of key military terms so that the USCs have a
common language. It is important to have a keen a
understanding of the key military terms involved with an
amphibious operation.
2. JCS Definition of Command
Command - The authority that a commander in the military
Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of
rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and
responsibility for effectively using available resources
and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing,
coordinating, and controlling military forces for the
accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes
responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline
of assigned personnel. [Ref. 4:p. 77]
a. Combatant Command (COCOM)
The Combatant Commander has non-transferable
command authority known as Combatant Command, which is set
forth in title 10, United States Code and is exercised only by
combatant USCs. This provides full authority to organize and
employ commands and forces as the Commander-in-Chief of a
combatant USC considers necessary to accomplish the assigned
missions. The Combatant Commander normally exercises his
authority through subordinate commanders which are usually
Service component commanders. [Ref. 4: p. 73]
B . CONTROL
Control becomes a very important factor concerning actual
engagement of military forces. As we can see from the various
levels of command listed above, there are also several layers
and types of control. In order to conduct an organized
military operation, all involved must understand the abilities
of different commands to control particular units and the type
of control they have over those units.
1. JCS Definition of Control
Control - Authority which may be less than full command
exercised by a commander over part of the activities of
subordinate or other organizations. [Ref. 4:p. 88]
a. Operational Control (OPCON)
Operational control - Transferable command authority which
may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below
the level of combatant command. Operational control is
inherent in Combatant Command (command authority) and is
the authority to perform those functions of command over
subordinate forces involving organizing and employing
commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating
objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary
to accomplish the mission. [Ref. 4:pp. 262-263]
b. Tactical Control (TACON)
Tactical control - The detailed and, usually, local
direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary
to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. [Ref. 4:p. 361]
c. Centralized Control
Centralized control - In air defence, the control mode
whereby a higher echelon makes direct target assignments
to fire units. [Ref. 4:p. 63]
d. Decentralized Control
Decentralized control - In air defense, the normal mode
whereby a higher echelon monitors unit actions, making
direct target assignments to units only when necessary to
insure proper fire distribution or to prevent engagement
of friendly aircraft. [Ref. 4:p. 104]
C. COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2 )
The purpose of command and control throughout the various
levels, is to ensure that the desires of the commander are
carried out by their subordinate commanders. This process
;
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flows down the chain of command until it reaches the area of
operation where the desires are executed. The process is
carried out "through an arrangement of personnel, equipment,
communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a
commander." [Ref. 4: p. 77]
1. JCS Definition of Command and Control
Command and control - The exercise of authority and
direction by a properly designated commander over assigned
forces in the accomplishment of the mission. [Ref. 4:p.
77]
2. JCS Definition of Command and Control System
Command and control system - The facilities, equipment,
communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a
commander for planning, directing, and controlling
operations of assigned forces pursuant to the missions
assigned. [Ref. 4:p. 77]
D. COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS (C3 )
In an effort to more accurately describe the process that
a commander uses to enact his desires on the battlefield, the
term Command, Control and Communications was developed. It is
hard to find a definition for C3 . JCS has not established a
definition for it. The reason for this may be that several
people believe that C3 does not accurately describe the
process. Many believe that it should be Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence (C 3 I) to indicate the vital
role that intelligence plays in the process. Others believe
it should be Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and
Intelligence (C4I) to bring in the importance that computers
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now play in relaying, displaying and calculating tactical data
in the process. Advocates of information systems believe the
term should be Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
Intelligence, and Information (C4 I 2 ) to emphasis the transfer
of data throughout the process. There are even those that
believe that it should be CmI n to show that there are an
infinite number of factors that go into the process. [Ref.
5:pp. 23-24]
In reality, "A rose is but a rose by any other name." No
matter what acronym you want to use to describe the process
that the system executes, the process remains the same. We
will use the term C3 for describing the process.
1. The C3 System
The C3 system is the most important factor in the
process. It must be a system that supports a process that is
known by all that use it. The system is really a number of
different systems tied together by several different means
with the goal of accomplishing the process within the
requirements established by the commander. All C3 systems, no







• User friendliness [Ref. 2:p. 25]
2. The "OODA Loop" and the Process
The Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) Loop was
designed by Mr. John Boyd to provide a generic description of
the process of a commander ensuring that his desires are






Figure 1 The OODA Loop [Ref. 5:p. 26]
It is important to remember that this is a generic
description. Anyone examining a specific system and its
process could get much more detailed in its description. It
is also necessary to realize that it is a continuous process.





To start the process, one must observe an object
in the environment for which the system was designed. In AAW
this is commonly done with an air search radar detecting an
air target. The means of detection, however, is not critical.
Any method that the system recognizes is valid. Once the
observance is made, we move to the next part of the process.
[Ref. 5:pp. 26-28]
b. Orient
Once an observance in the environment is made,
information from the observance must be oriented within the
system. In other words, the detection of an air target must
be relayed throughout the system. This is probably the
hardest job of the system. The data must get to those that
need it, but should not impede other operations within the
system. This is also where the commander sets his
requirements within the system for facilities, equipment,
communications, procedures, personnel, plans, and directions
for controlling the system's process. For the AAW arena, this
might involve a picket detecting a new air track, the
information from that detection relayed to the C3 system where
it is analyzed. If not already being tracked within the
system, it will be given a force track number and distributed
to the rest of the system. [Ref. 5:pp. 26-28]
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c. Decide
The decision to be made by the commander may be
influenced by the accuracy and timeliness of the C3 system.
He does, however, make the decision and then must convey that
decision or desire through the system to the subordinate
units. This may be the decision by the commander for the
radar picket to engage the newly detected track because he has
determined (with information from within or outside the
system) that it is hostile. The system relays this decision
to the picket. [Ref. 5: p. 31]
d. Act
Once the commander has made a decision to perform
a particular task, it remains the responsibility of that
subordinate commander to execute the order. This would
involve the radar pickets weapon systems being activated by
the picket's commander to fire an AAW weapon to destroy the
target that has been designated as a hostile air track. [Ref.
5:p. 29]
e. Environment
Once an order has been acted upon, the results of
that action and how it has effected the environment must be
reported back to the commander. This might be a feedback
report from the system that a missile was launched against the





This is the order given by the unified commander,
subunified commander, service component commander, or Joint
Force Commander to the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF)
to conduct an amphibious operation. It establishes the
Amphibious Task Force (ATF) , defines the Amphibious Objective
Area (AOA) , assigns a mission and designates the CATF,
Commander Landing Force (CLF) and other commanders as
appropriate. It also provides special instructions on command
relationships and instructions for the conduct of supporting




The primary purpose of an amphibious operation is to
establish a Landing Force (LF) on a hostile or potentially
hostile shore. This must be done quickly and with
overwhelming combat power in order to accomplish the mission.
The goal of the amphibious operation is to obtain a
site for an advanced naval, land or air base, deny the use of
an area or facilities to the enemy and prosecute further
combat operations. [Ref. 6:p. 1-1]
3. Types
a. Amphibious Assault
The Assault is the principal type of amphibious
operation which involves establishing a force on a hostile
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shore. The amphibious assault requires building up combat
power ashore from an initial zero capability to an effective
striking force. [Ref. 4:p. 26]
Jb. Amphibious Demonstration
The Demonstration is conducted for the purpose of
deceiving the enemy by a show of force. This action can
disrupt, delay or cause the enemy to select a course of action
which may be unfavorable to him. [Ref. 4: p. 27]
c. Amphibious Raid
The Raid involves a swift incursion into an
objective area for the purpose of a temporary occupation. The
Raid is followed by a planned withdrawal. [Ref. 4: p. 27]
d. Amphibious Withdrawal
The Withdrawal involves extracting forces by sea
in naval ships or craft from a hostile or potentially hostile
shore. [Ref. 4:p. 28]
4. Sequence of Operations
a. Planning
This phase extends from the issuance of the
initiating directive to embarkation. It is important to note
that planning is a dynamic on going process and does not end
until the mission is complete. [Ref. 67:p. 1-7]
Jb . Embarkation
This is the period in which forces, equipment and




This is the period in which plans and
communications are tested to ensure all echelons are familiar
with the plans. [Ref. 6:p. 1-7]
d. Movement
This is the period when forces from the ATF move
from embarkation areas to the AOA. This phase is completed
when the forces arrive at their designated areas within the
AOA. [Ref. 6:p. 1-7]
e. Assault
This period commences when the assault forces of
the ATF arrive in the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) and
continues until the accomplishment of the ATF mission. [Ref.
6:p. 1-7]
F. ANTIAIR WARFARE (AAW)
AAW is the action required to destroy or reduce to an
acceptable level, the enemy air and missile threat. It
includes such measures as the use of interceptors,
bombers, antiaircraft guns, surface to air and air to air
missiles, electronic countermeasures, and destruction of
the air or missile threat both before and after it is
launched. Other measures which are taken to minimize the
effects of hostile air action are cover, concealment,
dispersion, deception (including electronic) , and
mobility. [Ref. 4:p. 29]
AAW's goal is to gain and maintain air superiority which
is necessary for a successful amphibious operation.
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1. Air Superiority
Air superiority is the degree of dominance in the air
battle of one force over another which permits the conduct of
operations by its component land, sea and air forces at a
given time and place without prohibitive interference by the
opposing force. [Ref. 4:p. 21]
2. Air defense
Air defense is all defensive measures designed to
destroy attacking enemy aircraft or missiles or to nullify or
reduce the effectiveness of such attack. [Ref. 4:p. 14]
a. Active air defense
Active air defense is direct defensive action taken to
destroy attacking enemy aircraft or missiles or to nullify
or reduce the effectiveness of such attack. It includes
such measures as the use of aircraft, interceptor
missiles, air defense artillery, weapons not used
primarily in an air defense role, and electronic warfare.
[Ref. 4:p. 3]
b. Passive air defense
Passive air defense constitutes all measures, other than
active defense, taken to minimize the effects of hostile
air action. These include the use of cover, concealment,
camouflage, deception, dispersion, and protective
construction. [Ref. 4:p. 272]
3. Offensive AAW
Offensive AAW constitutes operations conducted against the
enemy air or air defense system before it can be launched
or assume an attacking role. Offensive AAW operations in
or near the objective area consist mainly of air attacks
to destroy or neutralize hostile aircraft, airfields,




It is essential to establish a fundamental understanding
of the terms and processes that are associated with AAW in
order to comprehend such a complex warfare. Chapter III
describes Navy and Marine Corps organization and command and
desribes the current doctrine in the form of principles used
by the Navy and Marine Corps to conduct AAW.
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III. CURRENT COMMAND CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE
A. JOINT ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND
All military operations conducted by unified Combatant
Commands are of a joint nature whether it is readily
recognizable or not. An amphibious operation may seem to be
primarily a Navy/Marine Corps operation, but there is
definitely a joint chain of command to the officer placed in






















COM ARFOR COM NAVFOR COM MARFOR COM AFFOF COM JSOTF
SUBORDINATE COMSTRIKFOR
LEGEND; COCOM UkV JOINT PUB 0-2
OPCON l*v JOINT PUB 0-2
SERVICE ADMINA.OOI8T1C SUPPORT
SUPPORTING OPERATIONS
Figure 2 Joint Organization [Ref. 9:p. II-6]
1. Commander-in-Chief (CINC)
The Commander-in-Chief is the officer that has been
placed in command of a unified or specified command. Unified
commands are responsible for specific geographical regions of
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the world and have components from each armed service. The
specified commands have a broad and continuing mission
established by the President and are composed of but one armed
service. Only the unified Combatant Commands are capable of
conducting amphibious operations on foreign soil. As of
December 1991, there are eight unified commands within the US
military organization:
e U.S. Space Command (CINCSPACECOM)
;
• U.S. Special Operations Command (CINCSOCOM)
;
• U.S. Transportation Command (CINCTRANSCOM)
;
• U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPACOM)
;
• U.S. Atlantic Command (CINCLANTCOM)
;
• U.S. European Command (CINCEUCOM)
• U.S. Central Command (CINCCENTCOM)
;
• U.S. Southern Command (CINCSOUTHCOM) . [Ref. 2:pp. 36-49]
The first three unified commands listed are supporting
commands. They themselves would not be responsible for an
amphibious operation, but would provide support to the other
five unified commands in their particular area of
responsibility. The last five unified commands are considered
combatant unified commands. The two specified commands,
Strategic Air Command and Forces Command, would also provide
support if requested by the unified Combatant Command
conducting the operation. [Ref. 2:p. 36-49]
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2. Commander-in-Chief Naval Forces (CINCNAV)
This is the senior officer of the USN assigned to the
CINC and is responsible to him for all naval forces assigned
to that unified command. He is also known as the component
commander. Any additional naval forces assigned to the CINC
for the conduct of the operation would chop to the Operational
Control (OPCON) of the CINCNAV for that CINC. CINCNAV would
normally transfer OPCON of participating units to the
Commander Naval Force (COMNAVFOR) assigned to the Joint Force
Commander (JFC) . [Ref. 8:p. 2-7 - 2-10]
3. Commander-in-Chief Air Forces (CINCAF)
This is the Air Force officer assigned to the CINC
that is responsible for all Air Force units assigned to that
unified command. All Air Force commands participating in an
amphibious assault would be under this component commander's
OPCON. If the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) is
not an Air Force officer, CINCAF would liaison directly with
the JFACC to ensure that the JFACC receives the support
required to accomplish the mission. [Ref. 8:p. 2-11 - 2-14]
4. Commander-in-Chief Army Forces (CINCAR)
Although there would normally be few Army forces
involved in an amphibious operation, those that were would be
under CINCAR' s command. If the amphibious operation is of an
extraordinarily large nature the likelihood of Army forces
being used increases greatly. It is possible for the
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Commander, Landing Force (CLF) to be an Army officer if the
majority of the assault forces are from the Army. [Ref. 8:p.
2-4 - 2-7]
5. Commander-in-Chief Marine Forces (CINCMAR)
As one would think, CINCMAR for the unified command
would be a key component commander for an amphibious
operation. He would be responsible for ensuring that there
were enough Marine Corps units to complete the mission of the
amphibious operation. [Ref. 8:p. 2-7 - 2-10]
6. Joint Force Commander (JFC)
The JFC would be the officer selected by the CINC and
his staff to be in charge of the units assigned to conduct the
amphibious operation. Since it is primarily a maritime
operation, it would most likely be a naval officer. The
senior representatives of each of the service's participating
in the operation would report to the JFC and be responsible to
him for that particular service's actions in the operation.
[Ref. 9:p. GL-11]
7. Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC)
The JFACC receives his authority from the JFC. He
will normally be from the service that has the most air assets
involved with the amphibious operation. Unless the operation
is occurring near airfields that are available for Air Force
aircraft to use, this would most likely go to a Naval Aviation
Officer (Navy or Marine) . The JFACC will be responsible for
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planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking of the Joint
Force air assets to accomplish the mission assigned by the
JFC. [Ref. 10:p. B-5]
B. NAVY ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND
The Navy organization and command is a very important
factor in conducting an amphibious assault. The smaller the
operation is, the less likely the CINCNAV would be in the area
of the amphibious operation. For that reason the CINC,
CINCNAV and the JFC would select a commander of the naval
units assigned to the operation that would be the on-scene
officer in charge of all participating naval units. This
officer would have the title of Commander, Naval Forces
(COMNAVFOR) . [Ref. 9
: pp . II-l - 11-11]
1. Of f icer-in-Tactical Command (OTC)
The OTC for naval forces involved in the amphibious
operation is COMNAVFOR. The naval armada could consist of
several different Battle Groups. Those that are supporting
the Amphibious Task Force (ATF) would report to the Battle
Group or Battle Force commander. Those that are part of the
ATF would report to Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF)
.
Each of these officers would report to the OTC/COMNAVFOR. The
OTC is responsible for the accomplishment of their assigned
mission and defense of all units assigned from threats that
may keep them from completing the assigned mission. It is
quite likely that the JFC and the COMNAVFOR would be the same
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Navy officer for small amphibious operations. [Ref . 6: pp. 1-2
- 1-3]
Threats are broken up into different warfare areas.
Since it would be nearly impossible for the OTC to be actively
involved in each of the warfare areas due to their complexity,
the Navy has devised the Composite Warfare doctrine. This
doctrine increases the efficiency and effectiveness of the OTC
in accomplishing his mission. [Ref. 11, pp. 2-1 - 2-2]
a. Composite Warfare Commander (CWC)
The CWC can be the OTC or his designated
representative. With the CWC concept, each warfare area has
a specified commander that reports to the CWC for his specific
area. In this doctrine, the OTC/CWC normally monitors the
actions of the commanders designated for each warfare area.
This decentralized control allows for rapid response to
multiple threats in multiple warfare areas. There are four
principle warfare commanders subordinate to the CWC. They are
the Antiair Warfare Commander (AAWC) , Antisurface Warfare
Commander (ASUWC) , Antisubmarine Warfare Commander, and Strike
Warfare Commander (STWC) (See Figure 3) . This allows the
CWC to be a manager of all the warfare areas and frees him
from becoming entangled in one tactical problem while another

































Figure 3 CWC Organization [Ref. 11 :p. 2-3]
2. Battle Group or Force Commander
The Battle Group Commander (BGC) is the officer in
charge of a Battle Group assigned to the amphibious
operations. The Battle Group is:
A subordinate task organization within the Task Force
that includes the non-amphibious surface ships and
naval aircraft assigned to the Task Force [Ref. 12 :p.
6].
Any amphibious operation which is expected to meet
with armed resistance will most likely have one or more
carrier battle groups assigned to provide protection and air
power projection for the Amphibious Task Force (ATF) . When
more than one Battle Group is involved, they are collectively
called a Battle Force. The Battle Force Commander (BFC) would
be the commander of the combined Battle Groups and each BGC
would be subordinate to him. Depending on the size of the
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operation, the BFC could also be the OTC and the JFC. [Ref.
ll:p. A-l - A-7]
3. Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF)
The CATF is the naval officer designated in the
initiating directive to be in charge of the ATF conducting the
amphibious operation. He is responsible for conducting the
landing operations and placing the Marines ashore. Throughout
this portion of the operation he is responsible for both the
Marine and naval force planning and operations to be carried
out in the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) . After the Marines
have established themselves ashore, the responsibility for
these forces shifts to the Commander Landing Force. [Ref.
6:p. 11-11]
Under current doctrine, the CATF has his own CWC
organization that controls all assets within the AOA. Any-
supporting forces not within the AOA will have their own CWC
organization that controls assets outside of the AOA. See
Figure 4. [Ref 13:pp. 9-2 - 9-4]
4. Commander Landing Force (CLF)
The officer designated by higher authority (in the
initiating directive) to command the landing force.
Equal in stature to the CATF during the planning phase
of the amphibious operation. Chops OPCON to the CATF
usually upon embarkation and until termination of the
amphibious operation. [Ref. 12 :p. 6]
5. Parallel Chain of Command
There are two separate chains of command for the
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Figure 4 Current CATF CWC Organization [Ref. 13 :p. 9-3]
have their own chain of command. The CATF and the CLF are co-
equal when it comes to planning and decisions for the
operation. Once the forces and equipment are embarked, the
CATF assumes overall responsibility for the Amphibious Task
Force (ATF) and the operation. Corresponding Naval and LF
subordinate commanders are established at all levels of the
amphibious organization. Extensive detailed coordination
occurs at all levels between both chains of command. The CATF
and the CLF work very closely together through their
respective chains of command for the success of the amphibious
operation. Matters of command that are specific to each
service is settled by the respective commander of that service
and his chain of command. Matters of command that are of
concern to both the Navy force and LF are settled through
28
corresponding Navy and LF chains of command. [Ref . 6: pp. II-3
- II-4]
6. Composite Warfare
The composite warfare doctrine allows the OTC to
aggressively conduct combat operations in all of the principle
warfare areas while carrying out the primary mission of the
force. It is very flexible and adaptable, allowing for the
effective control of multiple Battle Groups operating together
over great distances. Subordinate supporting CWCs can be
designated by the OTC when the size of the force, separation
of forces or distances involved require them. Each
subordinate CWC would have warfare commanders mirroring those
of the OTC/CWC. [Ref. 3:p. A-2]
a . Antialr Warfare Commander (AAWC)
The AAWC is responsible for the protection of
friendly forces from air attack. He must ensure the
integration of sea, land, air, and space early warning systems
to detect enemy aircraft and missiles [Ref. 3:p. IV-3]. AAWC
has Tactical Control (TACON) of assets participating in AAW.
He must direct the interception of air threats far enough from
the Battle Force to permit in-depth defense and prevent
engagement of friendly air assets. [Ref. 13 :p. 3-6]
(1) Sector Antiair Warfare Commander (SAAWC) . A
SAAWC is normally established by the CWC when the number of
threats and or Antiair Warfare (AAW) capable units is so large
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or spread apart that a single AAW command network would
degrade the overall C3 system of the AAWC. Each SAAWC acts as
the AAWC for their designated sector. As such, they have
Tactical Control (TACON) of the AAW assets assigned to their
sector. When there are multiple sectors, all SAAWCs are
reguired to coordinate with each other and report to the AAWC
all activities within their sector. Coordination between
SAAWCs becomes critical along the adjoining boundaries of
sectors. The AAWC remains the controlling authority over the
SAAWCs. [Ref. 14:p. 3-14]
(2) Local Antiair Warfare Coordinator (LAAWC)
.
The LAAWC is on a ship that is linked to the AAW C3 system of
the Battle Force. It acts as the gateway for the C 3 system to
those non-link capable ships assigned to it. It provides link
data to the ships assigned to it via a one way communication
system and in turn manually inputs data into the C3 system
concerning their AAW status and capabilities. Information is
normally transferred to the non-link ships via Link 14 (Link
14 is described in Chapter IV) . The system is designed to
provide only the AAW information relevant to the ships of the
LAAWC versus the complete picture of the actual Link. The
LAAWC reports to the SAAWC or AAWC, as appropriate, for all
ships assigned to him. The LAAWC and the ships assigned
constitute a single AAW element in the AAWC ' s Link. [Ref.
14:p. 3-14]
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b. Antisurface Warfare Commander (ASUWC)
The ASUWC is to neutralize hostile naval surface
forces and merchant vessels that can threaten the Joint Force.
He is in command of coordinating the search, tracking,
identification, and engagement of surface vessels. The ASUWC
normally has TACON over warships and Surface Combat Air Patrol
(SUCAP) aircraft assigned to screen the Battle Force from
hostile surface actions. [Ref. ll:p. 10-1]
c. Antisubmarine Warfare Commander (ASWC)
The ASWC denies the effectiveness of hostile
submarines against the Battle Force. He is involved in the
coordination of the search, localization, tracking,
classification, and attack of enemy submarines. The ASWC
generally exercises TACON over Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW)
assets such as Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) , helicopters,
towed array ships, and submarines assigned to the Joint Force
operating in support of his warfare area. The Submarine
Element Coordinator (SEC) is "a cell of the ASWC staff that,
when assigned, is responsible for coordinating the actions of
direct support submarines." [Ref. 3:p. A-l]
d. Strike Warfare Commander (S1WC)
The STWC is responsible for operations to destroy
or neutralize enemy targets ashore capable of conducting or
supporting air, surface, or subsurface operations against the
Joint Force. This normally involves the coordination of
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TOMAHAWK missile strikes with the Air Resources Coordinator
(AREC) , JFACC, and Supporting Arms Control Center (SACC)
.
SACC normally coordinates the Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS) and
Close Air Support (CAS) within the AOA. [Ref. 12 :p. 11]
e. Air Resource Coordinator (AREC)
The AREC does not fall under any of the warfare
commanders. He reports directly to the CWC. The AREC can act
as an advisor to the CWC or can act as a direct controller of
the naval air assets depending on the OTC desires. In either
case, however, the AREC must coordinate with the JFACC so that
all air assets are integrated into a common plan. [Ref. ll:p.
13-1]
C. MARINE CORPS AAW COMMAND ORGANIZATION
1. Commander Landing Force
The CLF is either an Army or Marine Corps officer who
has operational command of the Landing Force (which
may include aviation units). [Ref. 6:p. II-2]
The Landing Force (LF) can either be Army forces
and/or Marine Corps forces. When the LF is strictly Marine
Corps forces, it will be organized in a Marine Air Ground Task
Force (MAGTF) . [Ref. 6:p. II-7]
The CLF is responsible for the conduct of operations
ashore. He exercises operational control over all forces




2. Air Combat Element (ACE) Commander/Tactical Air
Commander (TAC)
The ACE commander has command authority over the Air
Combat Element that provides the air assets which support the
CLF. The ACE commander, acting as the TAC, exercises command
and control of his assets via the MACCS.
The TAC is the officer (aviator) responsible to the
landing commander (CLF) for the control and
coordination of air operations within the landing
force commander's area of responsibility when control
of these operations is passed ashore. [Ref. 4:p. 359]
The TAC is responsible for the direction, supervision, control
and coordination of all air operations within the AOA.
3. Senior Air Coordinator (SAC)
The SAC is responsible to the TAC for timely battle
management of the MAGTF ' s air defense system via execution
through the MACCS. The SAC coordinates and supervises the
functioning of the TACC operations section. He is responsible
for the overall execution of the Air Tasking Order (ATO)
.
[Ref. 16:p. 2-6]
4. Sector Antiair Warfare Coordinator (SAAWC) Ashore
The SAAWC is located with the Tactical Air Operations
Center (TAOC) and is responsible to the TAC for the
decentralized execution of the MAGTF ' s AAW plan.
He is responsible for the detailed planning to support
the G-3/S-3's (operations section) AAW concept of
operations within his assigned sector of
responsibility. [Ref. 15:p. 4-7]
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The SAAWC supervises and coordinates the activities of
the TAOC with other MACCS agencies. He will also provide
coordination with agencies that are external to the Marine
Corps. [Ref. 16:p. 3-4]
5. Senior Air Director (SAD)
The SAD is the senior director within the TAOC and is
responsible for the detailed operation of the TAOC.
He ensures the proper employment of all offensive and
defensive air operations within the TAOC sector of
responsibility. He reports to the SAAWC and is
responsible for his respective TAOC crew. [Ref. 16 :p.
3-4]
D. AREAS OF OPERATION/RESPONSIBILITIES
1. Amphibious Objective Area (AOA)
The AOA is defined as follows:
A geographical area, delineated in the initiating
directive, for purposes of command and control within
which is located the objective (s) to be secured by the
amphibious task force. This area must be of sufficient
size to ensure accomplishment of the amphibious task
force's mission and must provide sufficient area for
conducting necessary sea, air and land operations.
[Ref. 4:p. 27]
2. Naval Air Defense Operational Areas
The air space surrounding a Battle Force is divided
into specific areas in which different functions take place
within them. With the current Outer Air Battle (OAB)
doctrine, there are three designated areas with four possible














Figure 5 Navy AAW Zones and Areas [Ref. 14:pp. 5-1 - 5-3]
a. Surveillance Area
The Surveillance Area encompasses both the Vital
Area (VA) and the Destruction Area (DA) and is the outer limit
of the force AAW capabilities. This is where detection,
tracking and identification takes place. The dimensions of
this area are determined by the force sensors, disposition of
the force assets, weather and environmental effects, and the
electronic environment in which the force is operating. [Ref.
13:p. 2-6]
b. Vital Area (VA)
The VA is deep within the surveillance area in the
Outer Air Battle (OAB) . When it comes to amphibious
operations, however, the VA can be located on the very fringe
of the Surveillance Area depending on the assets providing
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surveillance. The VA is an area that contains the units on
which the primary mission of the force depends. For certain
operations, the VA may be replaced by a particular unit that
is critical for an operation to succeed. That asset is then
called the High Value Unit (HVU) . It is when the VA/HVU is a
point near or on the beach that causes the most vulnerability
due to greatly decreased early warning, reduced reaction time
and increased confusion. [Ref. 13 :p. 2-5]
c. Destruction Area (DA)
The DA surrounds the VA. This is the area in
which the airborne threat is planned to be destroyed. It
varies in dimension depending on the assets available to
protect the VA. Within the DA are two different zones. The
Outer Defense Zone (ODZ) and the Inner Defense Zone (IDZ)
[Ref. 13:p. 2-5]. The ODZ is keyed to the maximum range of
the AAW asset's sensors that are protecting the VA/HVU. The
IDZ is the engagement zone placed directly around the VA/HVU.
Both of these zones can have specific zones of engagement.
They are called the Fighter Engagement Zone (FEZ) and Missile
Engagement Zone (MEZ) . [Ref. 13:pp. 7-4 - 7-15]
(1) Outer Defense Zone (ODZ) . The ODZ is an area
encompassing the AAW SA outside of the IDZ. It is equivalent
in range to the maximum range of the maximum sensor range of
all units stationed outside of the IDZ. [Ref. 17:p. F-3]
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(2) Inner Defense Zone (IDZ) . Aircraft carriers
and the threat determine the location of the IDZ. For third
world threats, the IDZ is nominally a circle 50 NM around an
aircraft carrier. For threats with Soviet weapon systems the
range of the circle is increased to 100 NM. The radius of the
circle may be adjusted by the CWC based on the expected air
threat and geographical considerations. The IDZ is designed
to provide the carrier with a dedicated defense area. [Ref.
17:p. F-2]
d. Fighter Engagement Zone (FEZ)
The FEZ is part of the DA that is reserved for
intercepting a target with a particular aircraft's weapon
system. This is normally located beyond the missile
capabilities of the AAW ships of the Battle Force in the OAB,
but can be set for around and or near MEZs if need be. [Ref.
17:p. F-2]
e. Missile Engagement Zone (MEZ)
The MEZ is part of the DA where responsibility for
engagement rests with the Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) weapon
system of a particular surface unit. When possible, it is
separated from the FEZ so as to reduce the possibility of
fratricide. [Ref. 17:p. F-3]
E. NAVY PRINCIPLES OF AAW
The principles of AAW have the ultimate goal of
neutralizing threats from hostile aircraft or missiles. This
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is normally accomplished through several different phases.
The initial phase is the advance planning and preparation
phase. From this phase comes an AAW plan promulgated by the
AAWC. This plan sets guidelines and directives for the
disposition of forces, procedures for C3
,
preplanned responses
for expected threats, and the overall priorities and
objectives for AAW. [Ref. 13 :p. 9-31]
The second phase is the surveillance of the environment
surrounding the force. This involves the detection, tracking,
identification and assessment of air threats. The final phase
covers the engagement of hostile air tracks. It includes
engagement tasking, weapons system acquisition, target
intercept, and kill assessment. All of these phases are
governed by the AAW doctrine principles set by the Navy.
These principles are designed to assist the AAWC in
effectively managing the complex and inherent problems of
extended ranges and compressed reaction times. [Ref. 13:pp.
2-1 - 2-2]
1. Precise Rules of Engagement (ROE)
These are the directives issued higher authority that
establish the circumstances and limitations in which the
Battle Force will engage other forces in combat. To be
effective and meaningful they must be well defined,
unambiguous, specify weapon release authority and be
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promulgated to all involved in the operation. [Ref. 13: p. 2-
3]
2 . Early Warning
Early warning is becoming one of the harder things to
execute in AAW, especially in the Near/Overland AAW (NOAAW)
environment. Early Warning is derived from several different
sources. Ship-board sensors, including active and passive
electronic and acoustic sensors, are the platforms that have
the most on-station time. Airborne Early Warning aircraft and
tactical aircraft provide active and passive electronic
sensors as well as visual search for detecting potential
targets. Intelligence sources outside the Battle Force can
also provide timely warning information. All of the
information obtained from these sensors, however, must be
integrated into a C3 system so that it can be distributed in
a timely manner to those forces that can use it. [Ref. 13 :p.
2-2]
a. Difficulties of Early Warning for NOAAW
With the increasing range of Anti-Ship Missiles
(ASMs) , increased stealth of aircraft, terrain masking of
aircraft in the AOA and launches of missiles from the beach,
it becomes increasingly critical to have early warning.
Unfortunately the Navy has few assets that are capable of
providing this warning in the NOAAW environment. All
shipborne radars are susceptible to terrain masking which can
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cover the approach of aircraft attempting to attack ships
close to the beach. The E-2 HAWKEYE (described in more detail
in the Chapter IV) and other tactical aircraft can only
provide limited radar coverage when in the NOAAW environment.
The E-3 SENTRY provides an acceptable NOAAW capability, but
there is a limited number of them and when they suddenly move
into an area, they provide excellent "tipper" information to
the enemy. Even when Marine air defense assets are
established ashore, terrain can still interfere with the
surveillance of the AOA with their air search radars. As a
result of the drastically reduced early warning in NOAAW,
guick reaction tactics and procedures are a necessity. [Ref
.
18:p. 1]
3. Defense in Depth (DID)
DID is a key element in the survival of a naval Battle
Force. This defense reguires the establishment of mutually
supporting disposition of AAW forces to absorb and
progressively reduce an air attack. The AAWC achieves defense
in depth by employing multiple surveillance systems to detect
the enemy at maximum range (early warning) and by using weapon
systems that can intercept the threat as soon as possible.
The engagement of the threat must be sustained through the
different layers of the defense until the air threat is
eliminated. [Ref. I3:pp. 2-3 - 2-4]
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a. Difficulties of DID for NOAAW
DID is very limited in the AOA. For naval forces
at sea, DID is normally obtained by placing assets 3 60 degrees
around the VA or High Value Unit (HVU) at several different
distances. In the AOA, half of the circle around the ATF is
covered by hostile territory. This allows for coverage by air
or ground AAW assets only, which themselves become vulnerable
to the enemies ground and air assets. As a result, there are
many times when there is almost no DID at all for the ATF.
[Ref. 13:pp. 9-14 - 9-17]
4. Optimum Use of Available Assets
The optimum use of assets available strengths must be
exploited while reducing any of their weaknesses in the NOAAW
environment. Very seldom does a commander have enough of
everything that he would like in order to conduct a military
operation. The disposition of both air and naval forces must
mutually support one another in the accomplishment of the
NOAAW mission. Vulnerabilities of amphibious and auxiliary
ships operating near the beach must be well understood by all
participating in the air defense of the AOA. Assets must be
placed to protect the ground forces that are ashore from
hostile air attack. This could be in the form of placing an
AEGIS or NTU cruiser only a few miles off the beach to protect
the Marines ashore or to augment their air defenses. [Ref.
13:pp. 9-16 - 9-18]
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5. Counter-measures
Counter-measure are the actions taken to deny hostile
forces from accomplishing a particular function of the
targeting process. They can be passive and or active in
nature, but must be coordinated across the Battle Force so as
to not interfere with our own defensive or offensive
operations. These actions essentially are attempts at
breaking up the enemy's ability to launch weapons at the






• counter weapon (hard and soft kill). [Ref. 14:pp. 4-4 -
4-9]
6. Coordination and Control
Coordination and control are primary concerns of the
AAWC. The individual sensors and weapons of units assigned to
the Battle Force determine the true combat potential of that
force. However, it is the coordination and control through
the Command, Control and Communication (C 3 ) systems of the
Battle Force that generally determine the extent to which that
potential can be met. It is the objective of all commanders
to see, know and direct all that occurs in a battle. This
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requires the reliable, timely and comprehensive transfer of
data from the battle environment; the display of the data in
a form that lends itself to accurate and rapid absorption by
those needing it; quick and reliable dissemination of the
commander's decision to all of their subordinates; and a means
of continuously repeating this process. [Ref. 13:pp. 2-6 - 2-
8] This, in fact, is an Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act
(OODA) Loop and is the generic process that all C3 system
utilize [Ref. 5:p. 22 to 23]. When degraded by poor
coordination and control by the subordinates or hostile enemy
actions (i.e., jamming) the potential begins to decrease
rapidly. [Ref. 19:pp. 185-194]
F. MARINE CORPS PRINCIPLES OF AAW
There are three Marine Corps AAW principles that have
evolved throughout the years and have proven to be necessary
in order to achieve and preserve air superiority. These
principles include destruction in depth, mutual support, and
centralized coordination and decentralized control. [Ref.
7:p. 1-2]
1. Destruction in Depth
This principle is based on having threat detection and
destruction begin as far as possible from the vital area or
defended area and continuing as long as the threat exists.
The AAW area is divided into sectors which are determined by
factors such as effective communication range, detection
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range, both enemy and friendly weapons range and the threat
from air or surface attack. [Ref. 7:p. 1-2]
2. Mutual Support
"AAW weapons are employed and/or located to ensure
continuity of engagement" [Ref. 7:p. 1-2]. It is important
to structure the employment of AAW assets such that targets
can be engaged by more than one AAW element. This reduces the
possibility of aircraft or missiles penetrating the defended
area and therefore increasing the survivability of the landing
force. [Ref. 7:p. 1-2]
This integrated and overlapping pattern of mutual
support and continuity of engagement minimizes any
reduction in effectiveness of the AAW system resulting
from the loss of one or more AAW elements. [Ref. 7:p.
1-2]
3. Centralized Coordination and Decentralized Control
In order for the AAW system to reduce reaction time
and minimize damage, it must have the capability to operate in
a decentralized mode. Centralized Command and Control (C2 ) of
AAW is the CLF's responsibility, and is normally delegated to
the Tactical Air Commander (TAC) . The TAC exercises C 2 via
the various elements of the Marine Air Command and Control
System (MACCS) . Decentralization occurs when authority and
control is delegated to subordinate agencies that form the
MACCS. These subordinate agencies operate in the "silence is
consent" mode. Subordinate agencies can react to a threat
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immediately unless higher authority intercedes. [Ref. 7:p.l-
2]
G. MARINE AIR DEFENSE SECTOR
The Amphibious Ojective Area (AOA) is divided into sectors
of responsibility. One of these sectors will be assigned to
the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander. This
sector of responsibility gets further divided into air defense
sectors which must be designated and clearly defined. The air
defense sector is identified with three other areas, the vital
area, the destruction area and the surveillance area. [Ref.
7:p. 3-2]
1. Vital Area
A Vital Area is a designated area for which air
defense units provide protection.
It contains the facilities, units, and installations
necessary for the landing force to accomplish its
mission. [Ref. 7:p. 3-2]
In any given operation, more than one vital area can
be designated. Vital areas can include airfields, unit
headquarters and logistical support units. [Ref. 7: p. 3-2]
2 . Destruction Area
The Destruction Area is that portion of the sector for
air defense in which destruction or defeat of the
enemy airborne threat is planned and executed. [Ref.
7:p. 3-2]
This area is determined by factors such as the
airborne threat, effective communication range, surveillance
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area, terrain and weapons engagement capability. The
Destruction Area is partitioned into three dimensional (3D)
Weapon Engagement Zones (WEZs) . These include the MEZ,
crossover zone, FEZ and the Air Intercept Zone (AIZ) . [Ref.
7:p. 3-2]
a. Missile Engagement Zone (MEZ)
The MEZ is a three dimensional subdivision of the
destruction area in which surface to air missiles are the
primary weapons employed for the destruction of airborne
threats. [Ref. 7:p. 3-2]
b. Crossover Zone
The crossover zone is a three dimensional
subdivision of the destruction area which lies between the MEZ
and the Air Intercept Zone in which airborne targets become a
SAM target.
The crossover zone is the airspace separating adjacent
engagement zones where more than one type of weapons
system may engage the enemy airborne threat. However,
weapons systems making engagements in this zone will
normally be under positive control of the TAOC, EW/C
or airborne early warning aircraft. [Ref. 7:p. 3-3]
c. Air Intercept Zone (AIZ)
The AIZ is a three dimensional subdivision of the
destruction area in which the planned destruction of airborne
threats is primarily conducted via air to air engagements with
the employment of fighters. [Ref. 7:p. 3-3]
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d. Fighter Engagement Zone (FEZ)
The FEZ is a three dimensional subdivision of the
destruction area in which fighter aircraft are the primary
platform used to engage airborne threats. The Air Intercept
Zone (AIZ) may be subdivided into FEZ's. [Ref. 7:p. 3-3]
3. Surveillance Area
This area is where air search, detection and tracking
are conducted. The surveillance area should extend beyond the
destruction area in order to provide ample warning and
reaction time for target engagement. The destruction area is
only a portion of the surveillance area and is oriented
towards the designated sector of responsibility. The
surveillance area may extend into other air defense sectors.
[Ref. 7:p. 3-5]
Figure 6 is a possible arrangement of the destruction
area and its subdivisions and the surveillance area. The
actual arrangement depends on the tactical situation and asset
availability.
H. C3 AND AAW IN SUPPORT OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
A carefully planned and executed C2 organization provides
the MAGTF commander the ability to successfully conduct AAW
operations. "Command and Control enables the organization,
direction, coordination, and control of AAW assets." [Ref.
15:p. 3-1].
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Figure 6 Marine Corps FEZ/MEZ Concept [Ref. 7: p. 3-4]
C 2 is exercised by the ACE commander acting as the TAC
through the MACCS. The TACC (ashore) is the command agency-
through which the TAC exercises command. The TAC is delegated
control authority by the MAGTF commander [Ref. 15:p. 3-2].
Communications is provided by the Marine Wing Communications
Sguadron (MWCS) that ties all the MACCS agencies into one
cohesive functioning organization [Ref. 7:p 2-9].
AAW in support of amphibious operations reguires extensive
planning and close coordination. It is very complex in
nature. AAW in support of amphibious operations can be
described in five phases. These phases include air defense
during movement to the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA)
,
preassault AAW, AAW in support of the assault phase, phasing
control ashore and postassault operations. Postassault
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operations refers to air defense conducted once control is
phased to the CLF ashore, [Ref. 7:p. 3-9]
1. Movement to AOA
The responsibility for ATF AAW rests with the CATF
during movement of the Landing Force (LF) to the AOA.
Protection of the ATF is paramount. Air defense assets will
normally consist of carrier fixed wing aircraft and air
defense capable ships from the Battle Force. The CATF will
normally augment his air defense with organic weapons
providing point defense with the use of AV-8Bs, STINGERS,
helicopters and ships capable of firing air to air weaponry.
Prudent use of these assets should be exercised since there is
a limited amount of resources the LF can expend which may be
needed in order to accomplish the mission once ashore. [Ref.
7:p. 3-9]
2. Preassault AAW
Preassault Offensive AAW (OAAW) increases the
survivability of the ATF prior to entering the AOA. In order
to increase the possibility of a successful landing, air
superiority must be established. OAAW tries to destroy the
enemies offensive AAW assets prior to their employment. OAAW
should target and destroy as much as possible the opposing
force's airfields, logistic support facilities and air defense
systems. This will degrade the opposing force's capability to
49
interfere with the ATF's use of its air assets. [Ref . 7:p. 3-
9]
These operations are coordinated and controlled via
the CATF's TACC (afloat). Again, it is critical that the use
of the LF's assets be limited. The LF ' s assets must be
dedicated for the assault. If some of the LF's assets are
expended they will need to be replaced prior to the assault.
[Ref. 7:p. 9]
3. AAW in the Assault Phase
This is probably the most crucial phase for success of
the amphibious landing. Air superiority that may have been
gained during the preassault phase must be maintained and
exploited. The primary concern is air defense of the assault
troops. The CATF exercises control of air operations and
airspace control via the use of his Force AAWC (FAAWC) and the
TACC (afloat) . The AAW area is divided into two sectors for
control of AAW assets, the landward sector and the seaward
sector. These sectors are controlled via Sector Antiair
Warfare Coordinators (SAAWCs) . Each SAAWC controls air
intercept aircraft, Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft and
air defense capable ships within his sector. It is critical
that air surveillance be provided by AEW aircraft and
shipboard radars. Figure 7 depicts the assault AAW





Figure 7 AAW in Assault Phase [Ref. 7:p. 3-10]
As the LF assets continue to come ashore, initial air
defense ashore is provided by Low Altitude Air Defense (LAAD)
teams. Control and coordination is provided by the team's
section leaders who are located in the assault Fire Support
Coordination Center (FSCC) which provide deconf liction between
friendly aircraft in support of the assault and threat
aircraft. The senior LAAD commander ashore will establish
voice communications with his sections and the CATF ' s landward
SAAWC. He will eventually move into the Direct Air Support
Center (DASC) , when operational, in order to provide better
deconf liction and coordination of Offensive Air Support (OAS)
and threat aircraft. [Ref. 7:p. 3-10]
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Carrier air will continue to provide air defense for
the LF via the employment of Combat Air Patrol's (CAPs) under
control of the respective SAAWC. Deconf liction and
coordination between CAP aircraft and the LAAD elements will
be executed between the LAAD commander and the SAAWCs. For
the landward sector, CAP aircraft will normally be responsible
for threats in the medium to high altitude range while LAAD
elements will be responsible for the low altitude threats.
[Ref. 7:p. 3-10]
As more forces are phased ashore, additional air
defense assets become operational. LAAD will continue to
provide low altitude air defense for aircraft such as the AV-
8B, OV-10 and helicopters that commence operating from forward
bases ashore. Elements of the HAWK firing platoon augmented
by an Early Warning and Control (EW/C) site are phased in and
provide additional air defense capabilities ashore. The EW/C
provides land based surveillance and coordination for inland
AAW assets. These AAW assets are controlled by the CATF's
AAWC through the landward SAAWC. Data exchange and
coordination is conducted among HAWK, the EW/C, LAAD and the
SAAWC via established communications nets. See Figure 8.
[Ref. 7:pp. 3-10 - 3-12]
As the air defense system is strengthened by
additional HAWK missile batteries and LAAD elements coming
ashore, the TAOC will also be phased ashore. Once the TAOC is
operational, it will activate voice communications with the
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Figure 8 Landing Force AAW Means Ashore [Ref. 7:p. 3-12]
TACC FAAWC, EW/C, HAWK missile batteries, LAAD elements, AEW
platforms and CAP aircraft. Data link operation will commence
and may consist of the TAOC conducting Army Tactical Data
Link-1 (ATDL-1) with the HAWK missile batteries, TADIL-C with
CAP aircraft, TADIL-A with the TACC (afloat) , FAAWC and AEW
platforms, and TADIL-B with the EW/C site. [Ref. 7:p. 3-11]
4. Phasing Control Ashore
Once the TAOC is fully operational, it can assume
control of air defense for the landward sector upon approval
by the CATF. The FAAWC will be in direct control of the
TAOC. Once the landward SAAWC responsibilities are
transferred ashore, it is co-located with the TAOC, and the
TAOC becomes fully operational. It can assume the duties of
the Tactical Air Direction Center (TADC) until the TACC is
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phased ashore. The landward SAAWC afloat will then revert to
a backup monitor status ready to assume control again if
required. Normally, as equipment is phased ashore, the
Tactical Air Direction Center (TADC) will be under
construction near the Expeditionary Airfield (EAF) . Until
these agencies assume control ashore, the MAGTF's SAAWC is
responsible to the CATF ' s FAAWC for landward air defense and
to the CATF's Tactical Air Officer (TAO) for landward air
operations. See Figure 9. [Ref. 7:p. 3-12]
DrRECT—
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Figure 9 TAOC Ashore [Ref. 7:p. 3-12]
During this period several other MACCS agencies are
phased ashore and establish Expeditionary Airfield's (EAF) for
the support of Marine fixed wing assets. Once the EAF ' s are
operational with air defense aircraft, an integrated air
defense with HAWK missile batteries employing the FEZ/MEZ
concept is employed. [Ref. 7:p. 3-13]
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As the TACC is phased ashore and becomes operational,
it establishes communications with the TAOC, the Direct Air
Support Center (DASC) , the LF's aviation assets and the TACC
(afloat) . When these communication links have been
established, it will assume the role of TADC. The Commander
of the Landing Force (CLF) , who is now ashore, will conduct
control and coordination between his AAW C3 system and the
TACC (afloat) through the TADC. When operations have become
well established, the CLF can request control of the AOA's
airspace and aviation assets to be phased ashore and have the
TACC (afloat) phased ashore. See Figure 10. [Ref. 7:p. 3-13]
DIRECT—
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Figure 10 TADC Ashore [Ref. 7: p. 3-14]
Upon approval from the CATF and the TADC becoming
fully operational, the TADC becomes the TACC (ashore)
.
Overall control is then phased ashore reverting the TACC
(afloat) to a TADC status which will monitor the TACC (ashore)
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ready to assume control again if required. The CLF now has
overall AAW and airspace management control responsibilities
for the AOA which he exercises via the TACC (ashore) . See
Figure 11.
The entire process of establishing a MACCS ashore can
take anywhere from 18-21 days. This process is situation
INDIRECT £23 SAAWC (SEA)
Figure 11 TACC Ashore [Ref. 7:p. 3-14]
dependent and can take longer if the amphibious landing is
severely opposed. [Ref. 21:p. 4-8]
5. Postassault Operations
This includes operations conducted once the amphibious
operation is completed. There are several factors that are
used as guidelines to determine when the amphibious operation
is over but the underlying factor is when the CLF determines
that he has sufficient combat power and is ready to assume
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full responsibility for subsequent operations. At this point
the CATF and CLF will recommend to higher authority that the
amphibious operation be terminated. Once officially
terminated, the CLF will conduct postassault operations.
[Ref. 7:p. 3-13]
I . SUMMARY
Each service is organized differently for war. It is
important to grasp a basic understanding of the principal
commanders and their functions involved in AAW. This leads to
a better understanding of those responsible for employing AAW
doctrine. The next chapter provides a discussion of the
Command, Control, and Communication (C3 ) systems that allow
commanders to exercise Command and Control (C2 ) and employ AAW
principles as discussed earlier.
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IV. CURRENT C3 SYSTEMS
A. COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION (C3 ) SYSTEMS
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) do not have a definition
for C3 systems. They do, however, provide a definition for
Command and Control (C2 ) , which was discussed in Chapter II.
We are using C3 because it emphasizes the importance of
communications within the C 2 definition. A C 3 system links
active and passive defense and attack capabilities to provide
timely assessment of the threat, rapid dissemination of
tactical warning, targeting data, and mission tasking to the
appropriate assets for all warfare areas. For every
operational unit linked with the C 3 system, it must provide
rapid communication among the units, a fusion capability, a
decision making process, warning systems, and operational
means [Ref. 22 :p. 111-25] . Although most of the US Navy's C3
systems are designed for the fast pace of Antiair Warfare
(AAW) , they can also provide critical data for other warfare
areas. These C 3 system must use their limited resources
efficiently to manage tactical air defense operations without
significant loss to other operational capabilities. [Ref.
22:p. 111-25]
58
1. Tactical Data Information Links (TADILs)
Tactical Data Information Links (TADILs) are used in
the US Navy as the primary means of communications for
tactical data exchange between the various units of a Battle
Force. Most TADILs are also known as "Links". There are
different types of Links for different types of assets and the
missions they are assigned. [Ref. 23:pp. 18-19]
a. TADIL-A (Link 11)
TADIL-A is also known as Link 11 and is the
primary data exchange system between naval combatants,
airborne sensor platforms and certain shore establishments
that supports all warfare areas. This communication system is
designed to allow a unit within the C3 system to access all
available information from the other units participating in
the system. Data is exchanged according to Link 11 net
protocol shown in Figure 12.
TADIL-A requires that one ship be designated as
the Net Control Station (NECOS) to ensure an orderly flow of
data throughout the C 3 system. [Ref. 23 :p. 18]
...It acts to establish the net and to supervise the
protocol governing when each participating unit transmits
its own ship track report to the rest of the net. The
other ships act as picket stations, listening for all
data, but broadcasting only once per net cycle in response
to a roll-call polling from the net control station.
Broadcast track information is received by all other net
members and entered as remote track data in their command
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Figure 12 Link 11 Net Cycle Operations [Ref. 24 :p. 26]
With continuing modifications to Link 11 over the
years, it has proven to be a fairly reliable system. It does
provide for encryption of the data, but is not jam resistant.
Additionally, for every unit that participates in the Link,
the net cycle time increases. Therefore, there is a tradeoff
on the number of units in the Link and the Links' ability to
be a near real time data exchange system. [Ref. 23:pp. 18-19]
b . TADIL-B
TADIL-B is a secure point to point serial Link
that has no Link designation. It is a ground based data
exchange system used primarily by the Army, Air Force, and
Marine Corps for air defense. It is comparable to, but not
compatible with Link 11. TADIL-B and the Army Tactical Data
Link-1 (ATDL-1) are different Links but operate in a similar
manner and are fully interoperable. [Ref. 23 :p. 18]
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c. TADIL-C (Link 4A)
Link 4A or TADIL-C is the Navy and Marine Corps
primary aircraft data exchange system between a controlling
sensor platform and an aircraft intercepting an air track. It
provides a one or two way data exchange between the
controlling platform and the interceptor's weapons control
system. This Link is not encrypted, nor is it jam resistant.
Most controlling units are able to conduct several Link 4A
operations at the same time. [Ref. 23 :p. 18]
d. Link 14
Link 14 has no TADIL designation. It is only a
one way broadcast system that provides limited Link 11 data to
ships that are not equipped with TADIL-A via a teletype
printout. At best it is a slow semiautomatic communications
system. Although Link 14 is still present, it is only used in
older combatants and auxiliary ships. [Ref. 23 :p. 19]
e. TADIL-J (Link 16)
This is the planned replacement for all exsisting
US aircraft data Links. The Link consists of common
synchronizing pulses combined with frequency hoping over a
bandwidth of several hundred MHZ on a pulse to pulse basis.
Units within the net are assigned time slots in the system's
cycle. One unit is designated as the time reference and
maintains the timing of the net. In each slot, every other
message pulse is redundant, so that messages can be
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reconstructed during heavy jamming. The beginning of each
slot has a jitter that varies the actual begining of data
transmission. The data rate can be doubled by eliminating
both the jitter and the redundant message pulse, but its
ability to operate in jamming environments is greatly reduced.
[Ref. 23:p. 19]
f. Communication Systems and C3 Systems
All of these Link communication systems are not in
and of themselves a C 3 system. They form a means of
communications for data exchange between the units in a C3
system. They are not the sole means of communication either.
Link operations in the USN are operated with several voice
radio networks (nets) that provide additional Coordination and
Reporting (C&R) for the C 3 system. Normally, these C&R nets
supplement the Link's communications and provide human
cognitive control and confirmation of data that is not easily
absorbed by the operators from the Link. The Links and C&R
nets each form a subsystem of a C3 system. [Ref. 23:pp. 84-
86]
g. Equipment, Facilities, Personnel and Procedures
The equipment, facilities, personnel and
procedures portion of a C 3 system are located within each
participating unit of a C 3 system and are designed to maximize
each asset's capabilities in the C3 process. For most Navy
ships, this is done in the Combat Information Center (CIC)
.
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Personnel receive specialized training for the particular
watch stations they are assigned that provides inputs to or
operates computers within the C3 system. The C3 system process
within an individual force is guided by the OTC s plans and
instructions promulgated to the force. [Ref. 13: pp. 3-1 - 3-
12]
For larger ships (i.e., CVs, LHAs, LHDs, etc.)
there are several different cells for specific areas of
information that provide inputs to the CIC and the C3 system.
CIC is the heart and brains of naval combatants. All sensor
and weapon control systems are fused within the CIC and
integrated with the C3 system through various means. Each
sensor system and weapon control system in a ship forms a
subsystem of the ship's and the Battle Force's C3 system.
[Ref. 13:pp. 4-22 - 4-24]
B. NAVAL TACTICAL DATA SYSTEM (NTDS)
The advent of radar for naval forces in World War II (WW
II) produced a change in paradigms for anitair warfare. Radar
allowed for the advance warning of aircraft approaching the
fleet. To maximize on the advantages of radar, CICs were
developed in warships for the manual plotting and tracking of
air contacts. Additionally, radio voice networks were
developed to assist Combat Air Patrol (CAP) aircraft in
intercepting aircraft prior to reaching the AA gunfire of the
fleet. This C3 system was slow, manpower intensive, prone to
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human error and did not always have accurate and reliable data
from the early model radars, but was much better than no
system at all. By the Korean war, several factors combined to
produce a need for a more automated C3 system. Jet aircraft
and self-guided missiles had replaced the propeller driven
aircraft and free fall bombs of WW II. The rate at which
tactical data changed increased greatly and the size of the
enviroment grew with both weapons and sensor improvements.
This need lead to project COSMOS. COSMOS was an extensive
study covering data communications, data processing and data
exchange between ships. A project was also started at Cornell
Aeronautical Laboratories to design an intercept tracking and
control console. This project concentrated on the use of
digital computers for the correlation of radar data from
several platforms and the solution of threat evaluation and
weapon assignment problems. In 1954 Project LAMPLIGHT was
commenced to formulate recommendations for continental air
defense at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The
fruition of these projects lead to the requirements that
produced the NTDS. [Ref. 26:pp. 53-54]
NTDS has been organized around two related functions.
Integration of available sensor data into a meaningful
tactical plot is the first function. This is generally done
in a two dimensional (2D) compiled summary of the surrounding
sea and air environment out to 512 nm. The plot also attempts
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to identify friendly and hostile tracks while others are
marked as unknown tracks. There are three basic category of
tracks; air, surface, and subsurface. Secondly,
they often partially or completely automate the
results of decisions taken by means of the plot. For
example, using an electronic plot, an officer may
designate a target for attack. This designation at a
console in CIC will result automatically in the proper
orders being given to, say, a surface-to-surface missile
launcher. In some systems automation extends further.
The combat system identifies particularly urgent threats
and initiates reactions (such as missile firings) against
them. In such cases the display allows the monitoring
officer to abort the reaction while it is being made.
[Ref. 23:p. 48]
It is important to realize that NTDS is primarily a
coordination and display system. Although the system is
capable of automated alerts and recommendations to engage
tracks, this is based solely on a track's course and speed.
It does not take into account possible weapons capabilities,
tactics the enemy may be using or other tactical information
that may influence a decision to engage. The Tactical Action
Officer (TAO) and the Commanding Officer (CO) use their
experience and knowledge to add information needed for
decisions to engage tracks. [Ref.23:p. 81]
1. Facilities
NTDS facilities have been installed on all major
warships from the late 1960's. This process has evolved over
the last 30 years to a point that all combatants since 1974
have been built with NTDS. Only with the advent of the
TICONDEROGA class cruiser was a more modern system installed
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on new construction ships. Modifications have been made to
most ships throughout the years. The system has evolved from
the early days of manual entry of track data into the console
to computer systems that automatically integrate sensor,
weapon control and Link 11 data. Amphibious ships that play
a key role in C3
,
such as the LCCs and LHAs, have also
received the NTDS. There have also been several shore sites
on the East and West coast of the US that have had NTDS
installed to aid in training and to conduct exercises with air
and surface assets. [Ref. 26:pp. 56-59]
2 . Equipment
NTDS reguires a large amount of a ship's volume to be
able to accomplish the fusion of ship's sensors, weapon
systems, and display consoles with a communication system that
exchanges data with other ships in the Battle Force.
Computers are reguired at almost every point of the system to
overcome the rapidly changing environment of AAW and reduce
human error. Additionally, since most of the early weapon
systems and peripheral systems were of an analog design,
numerous computers were needed to act as a translator for data
flow between them and NTDS. The computers for the NTDS are
specifically built for the military and meet Military Standard
(MIL-STD) reguirements. Because of the MIL-STD reguirements,
military computers have generally lagged far behind the
operating capabilities of commercial computers and cost much
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more due to the relatively low volume of production and
special requirements made by the military. The UYK-7 and UYK-
2 computers form the major portion of the computers used in
current versions of the NTDS and are based on 1960's
technology. [Ref. 27:pp. 27-39]
3. Communications
a. Radio Voice Nets
Link operations in the USN are operated with
several radio voice nets that provide additional C&R for the
C3 system. Normally, these C&R nets supplement the Link's
communications and provide human cognitive control and
confirmation of data that is not easily absorbed by the
operators from the Link. Since there are several warfare
areas that use data from the NTDS, there is usually at least
one voice net per warfare area to provide C&R for that
particular area. Additionally, there is always one voice net
dedicated for operators to communicate with the Net Control
Station (NECOS) to ensure that the Link operates as
efficiently and effectively as possible. [Ref. 25:pp. 3-1 -
3-5]
b . Links
The NTDS is capable of numerous types of Link
operations. Most ships are capable of High Frequency (HF) and
Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Link 11 operations. Those ships
that have the specific warfare mission of controlling
67
interceptor aircraft are able to operate several different
Link 4A connections while conducting Link 11 operations. Most
ships that are fully Link 11 capable also have the capability
to broadcast and receive Link 14. [Ref. 26:p. 57-58]
c. Connectivity
Connectivity of the NTDS and its various Links has
become an increasing concern with regards to joint operations.
The Navy's Link 11 is a capable system compared to other
military data exchange systems. However, it is not
interoperable with other major US or NATO systems such as
TADIL-B and Link 1 used in the NATO Air Defense Ground
Environment (NADGE) C3 system. This has led to many
interoperability problems between the Armed Forces. The most
noticeable test of this C3 systems interoperability with C3
systems of the US military came during Operation DESERT STORM.
Figure 13 shows the connectivity Links between several C3
systems fielded to the area. It should be noted that if it
were not for the Marine Corps and its TADIL-B/Link 11 gateway
capability, the Navy would not have been integrated with Army
and most of the Air Force's systems. [Ref. 28]
4. Procedures and Personnel
The procedures and personnel involved with any C3
system are key components of its process. It is critical that
the operators receive the same type training and use the same
procedures while carrying out the process of the system.
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Figure 13 Desert Storm TADIL Architecture [Ref. 28]
While each of the Armed Forces conduct integrated training
programs within their own communities, they do not train to
the same procedures. An example of this is a comparison of
Navy and Marine Corps Link procedures. Even though these two
services frequently operate together, they do not always use
the same procedures for maintaining a Link.
Navy Link procedures call for the use of "X-ray" codes
frequently while conducting Link operations [Ref. 25:p. 3-5],
The Marines rarely use "X-ray" codes for Link operations.
Navy personnel within the NTDS system are rarely trained as
technicians for the Link system and are normally trained only
in the procedures of its use [Ref. 26:pp. 1-1 - 1-4]. Marines
are now trained as both operators and technicians. Marine
operators are responsible for initiating and maintaining all
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Link operations. Technicians no longer set up the Link and
hand it over to the operators when operational. Most Navy
operators do not understand the technically-related issues
concerning the setup and conduct of Link operations. As a
result, Marine operators are forced to talk operational AAW
matters over the AAW coordination and reporting (AAW C&R)
radio voice network and switch to the Link coordination and
reporting (Link C&R) radio voice network to discuss technical
problems at the same time. The Navy, meanwhile, has a
separate person on each of the nets operating simultaneously.
These differences have caused considerable delays and
confusion in Link coordination between the two Services.
C. AIRBORNE TACTICAL DATA SYSTEM (ATDS)
The Airborne Tactical Data System (ATDS) is a system that
is comparable with the NTDS designed for use aboard aircraft.
The ATDS specification was issued in 1955, but there was no
computer system available at that time to meet its
requirements [Ref. 23:p. 105]. A surveillance aircraft's ATDS
does not have to include the capabilities of integrating
several different onboard weapon systems like its NTDS
counterpart. This alone allowed for substantial savings in
space and weight required of the ATDS. It was not until the
late-1960's when the E-2A HAWKEYE squadron deployments began,
that an ATDS system was routinely used in Link operations with
the fleet. Its estimated ability to maintain 250 tracks and
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control 30 interceptions was several orders of magnitude
greater than the system that it replaced [Ref. 23:p. 106].
The E-1B and its manual airborne CIC plots could maintain 4-6
tracks and could control only two simultaneous interceptions
using voice control. ATDS and its automatic data link have




The E-2 HAWKEYE was designed from the beginning as
an Airborne Early Warning (AEW) platform. The prototype first
flew in October of 1960 and introduced the concept of a giant
rotodome radar rotating on a pylon above the aircraft's
fuselage to enable 360 degree coverage [Ref.30:p. 93]. The
HAWKEYE also carries an Electronic Support Measures (ESM)
system that allows passive detections of radar emissions. The
E-2 has been produced in three versions; E-2A, E-2B and E-2C.
In addition to these versions of the aircraft, the radar has
been modified and changed numerous times. To date, the E-2
has operated the APS-96, APS-120, APS-125, APS-138, and APS-
139 air search radars. The most current version of the
HAWKEYE is the E-2C with the APS-139 radar. [Ref. 23:pp. 374-
376]
71
(1) Sensors. The sensors of the E-2C, are its
main assets. The APS-139 3D air search radar can provide
detection out to 300 miles. The combined capabilities of the
APS-139, ATDS and Link 4A allow this airborne CIC to maintain
over 2,000 air and surface tracks and control more than 40 air
intercepts. The ALR-67 allows passive detection of radar
emission over 600 miles from the emitter. This passive
detection system can also be integrated with the ATDS to allow
force dissemination of possible hostile radar emissions and




The E-2C and its ATDS is
capable of HF or UHF Link 11 operations concurrent with
several Link 4A operations. Unfortunately, it is not
interoperable with TADIL-B, Link 1 or Link 16, which are
discussed in above. This AEW aircraft can also operate
several UHF radio voice nets for C&R with other assets
participating in the different Links. [Ref. 31:pp. 1-41 - 1-
42]
Jb. E-3 SENTRY
Although the E-3 SENTRY is an Air Force asset, it
is well known for its Nearland/Overland Antiair Warfare
(NOAAW) capabilities. The SENTRY is better known as the
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) . The AWACS is
considered a strategic asset as it was designed primarily to
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provide contingency continental air defense during nuclear
attack [Ref. 2: p. 86]. Over the years however, it has been
used mostly for its tactical C3 system capabilities in US
military operations around the world. It is such a valuable
asset that its mere presence in an area is an automatic
"tipper" that a military operation is underway.
(1) Sensors . The APY-1 air search radar is the
main sensor for the earlier versions of the E-3. Aircraft
after number 25 and upgrades of the earlier production
aircraft have received the APY-2 system which has a maritime
surveillance capability. These are E/F Band radar systems
that can function in seven different modes of operation.
These seven different modes allow the E-3 SENTRY to be an
excellent surveillance platform in the Nearland/Overland AAW
(NOAAW) scenario even in a heavy jamming environment. The
rotodome is rotated at six RPM when the radar is operational
and its scan is mechanical in azimuth and electronical from
the ground to the stratosphere. [Ref. 32 :p. 365]
(2) Connectivity. The E-3 SENTRY is well known
for its connectivity. It is capable of TADIL-A, TADIL-C and
TADIL-J operations at the same time. It has an extensive
communications suite that allows it to operate numerous radio
voice nets for C&R with other assets. [Ref. 32 :p. 365]
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c. S-3 VIKING and P-3 ORION
The VIKING and Orion are primarily Antisubmarine
Warfare (ASW) and Antisurface Warfare (ASUW) aircraft. They
both carry an ATDS with Link 11 capability. This Link
capability is provided primarily for scouting ahead of a force
for surface and subsurface contacts and coordinating attacks
and does not provide timely AAW information. It is hoped that
these platforms can coordinate an attack on missile carrying
submarines and surface vessels before they can launch their
missiles. [Ref. 30:pp. 90-91]
D. COMBAT DIRECTION SYSTEM (CDS)
CDS was designed to meet two criteria. The first was to
provide a greatly improved NTDS type system for the
TICONDEROGA class AEGIS ships [Ref. 23:p. 85]. Secondly it
was also to be the system that replaced NTDS in ships that
were to receive New Threat Upgrade (NTU) modifications
[Ref.29:p. 145]. The system was to reduce the number of
computers, increase reliability, replace analog systems where
feasible and economical, and automate as many functions within
the system as possible. [Ref. 23 :p. 85]
1. Facilities
The CDS is installed on the earlier series of
TICONDEROGA class cruisers and all ships that have received
NTU modifications. This is an interim system for the
TICONDEROGA class. It is eventually to be replaced by the
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Advanced Combat Direction Center (ACDS) . Due to the reduced
military budget of the 1990" s, it is unlikely that the NTU
ships will receive the complete upgrade to ACDS capability.
ACDS is discussed in Chapter VII. [Ref. 23 :p. 85]
2 . Equipment
The equipment within this system is designed primarily
to eliminate the translators between an analog and digital
system by replacing most analog systems with digital versions
that can directly exchange information with CDS. This has
occurred mainly with the weapon systems. Automation is
greatly enhanced with the use of SYS-2 Integrated Automatic
Detection and Tracking (IADT) . IADT eliminates human entry of
tracks into the system and instead allows them to manage the
flow of tracks created by the search radars. The SYS-2 system
also integrates the data received by the search radars and
produces a single radar picture [Ref. 23 :p. 354]. The design
of the overall system allows for any one connection of a
ship's Weapons Direction System (WDS) , CDS and IADT triangle
to be eliminated while the other two continue to operate
together (See Figure 14). [Ref. 32:p. 36]
CDS alone allows for a vast improvement in the display
of tactical data. Automated Status Boards (ASTABS) have
replaced manually updated status boards with information
received directly from CDS. Additionally, Large Screen
Displays (LSDs) have been added to enhance the ability of a
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UNK4A UNK11
Figure 14 CDS Triad Design [Ref. 33 :p. 37]
commander to see and comprehend the tactical data displayed by
CDS. The LSD is essentially a large screen television that
replaces the conventional console display. [Ref. 23 :p. 83]
3. Communications
Although CDS is a vast improvement over NTDS, it does
not improve upon any of the communication Links. Ships that
have CDS can still operate a Link 11 system simultaneously
with several Link 4A operations. However, they are still not
interoperable with the other major data exchange systems of
the US military and NATO.
E. MARINE AIR COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM (MACCS)
The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) requires close
coordination between air and ground units. The Aviation
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Combat Element (ACE) commander exercises command and control
via the MACCS. The MACCS is composed of a variety of agencies
that provide near real time information that allow the ACE
commander acting as the Tactical Air Commander (TAC) and
subordinate commanders to make sound tactical decisions.
[Ref. 16:p. 1-1]
Figure 15 depicts the organization of the agencies that
are under the command of the Marine Aircraft Wing that provide
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Figure 15 MACG AAW Agencies [Ref. 15:p. 2-6]
F. MARINE AIR CONTROL GROUP (MACG)
The MACG is the subordinate element of the Marine Aircraft
Wing (MAW) that provides all the agencies that form the MACCS.
The mission of the MACG is to coordinate the air command and
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control systems of the MAW. It is commanded by a Colonel.
[Ref. 16:p. 2-9]
The Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron (H&HS)
provides the administrative and maintenance support for the
MACG headquarters. It is commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel
and provides the personnel that operate the Tactical Air
Command Center (TACC) [Ref. 16:p. 1-2]. The H&HS will soon
be redesiqnated as the Marine Tactical Air Command Squadron
(MTACS) [Ref. 15:p. 2-6].
1. Tactical Air Command Center (TACC) Ashore
The TACC is the primary air control agency of the
Amphibious Task Force (ATF) . It is also the senior agency of
the MACCS. [Ref. 16:pp. 1-1 - 2-1]
It is the facility from which the TAC and ACE battle staff
can supervise, coordinate and execute all current and
future tactical air operations over the MAGTF • s airspace
and coordinate organic aviation with that of other
services. [Ref. 16:pp. 1-1 - 2-1]
The TACC is a major player in the MACCS. The TACC
provides the facilities for the TAC to direct, control,
coordinate and supervise all MAGTF tactical air operations.
The TACC is equipped with the communications and data link
necessary to gather and disseminate information that may
affect the conduct of tactical air operations. [Ref. 34 :p. 2]
The TACC in executing its duties is responsible for
the following:
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• Maintaining accurate and up to date information on the air
situation including ground combat information essential to
the air effort.
• Managing all aircraft in the objective area to ensure the
most balanced and effective utilization of assets for
tactical air operations.
• Supervising the operations of subordinate MACCS agencies
to preserve economy and unity of effort in the execution
of the TAC's air plans.
• Prescribing succession of command and control
responsibilities with the MACCS and to compensate for any
serious degradation within a component agency. [Ref.33:p.
3]
The TACC is divided into the plans section and the
operations section.
a. Plans Section
The plans section is manned by elements from the
MAW and is responsible for allocating assets and publishing
the daily Air Tasking Order (ATO) . The most important
elements of the plans section is the G-2 (Intelligence) and
the G-3 (Operations) because they provide the TAC with the
most current intelligence and with that intelligence construct
the ATO. [Ref. 34:p. 4]
b. Operations Section
The operations section is run by the Senior Air
Coordinator (SAC) . The SAC is responsible to the TAC for the
operation of the TACC. Once the ATO is published, the
operations section is responsible for its distribution to all
the required MACCS agencies. Once the ATO is distributed, the
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operations section is responsible for its execution or any
other fragmentary orders. The operations section also
provides the TAC with a digital display of the air war. [Ref
.
34:p. 4]
2 . TACC Equipment
The TACC consists of two major equipment groups, the
AN/TYQ-1 and the AN/TYQ-3A.
a . AN/TYQ-1
The AN/TYQ-1 provides the work space for the TACC
personnel. The SAC and his staff operate from this shelter.
It houses the automated displays and communications. The
shelter is made of rubber and held up by forced air which is
why it is often referred to as "the bubble". The AN/TYQ-1
consist of three equipment groups, the AN/TYA-1 operations
group, the AN/TYA-3 planning group and the AN/TYA-16A
communications group. [Ref. 34 :p. XIII-5]
The AN/TYA-1 is the bubble that houses five
Situation Display Consoles (SDC) , ten Communications Control
Units (CCU) , a Weapons Availability Status Display (WASD) , and
various status and plotting boards. [Ref. 34 :p. XIII-5]
The AN/TYA-3 is the bubble that houses the plans
personnel, the command console which controls the command
display, six CCU's and several status and plotting boards. The
TAC will reside in this bubble. [Ref. 34:p. XIII-17]
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The AN/TYA-16A provides all terminal and control
facilities required for the TACC. [Ref. 34 :p. XIII-18]
b. AN/TYQ-3A Tactical Data Communication Central
The AN/TYQ-3A provides tactical data
communications for the TACC. The TDCC provides the means to
conduct data link operations such as HF or UHF Tactical Data
Information Link-A (TADIL-A ) . It has ten TADIL-B/Army
Tactical Data link (ATDL-1) of which two may be Nato Air
Defense Ground Environment (NADGE) link-1 and one TADIL-C,
also known as Link-4A. The TDCC can interface and translate
information among links such as NADGE and TADIL-A and/or
TADIL-B. The TDCC can also provide secure HF and UHF voice
communications. [Ref. 34:p. VIII-20]
G. MARINE AIR CONTROL SQUADRON (MACS)
The MACS provides air surveillance and control of aircraft
and surface to air weapons for antiair warfare in support of
the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) . The MACS provides this support
via the employment of the Tactical Air Operations Center
(TAOC) and the Early Warning and Control (EW/C) site. [Ref.
16:p. 1-2]
1. AN/TYQ-2 Tactical Air Operation Center
The TAOC provides the necessary equipment for air
surveillance and control of aircraft and missiles. Radars and
computerized equipment provide the means for air surveillance,
Ground Controlled Intercepts (GCI) and air traffic control.
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Control of missiles is performed via voice communications and
tactical data link. [Ref. 34:p. 1-2]
The mission of the TAOC is as follows:
The mission of the TAOC is to detect, identify and control
the intercept of hostile aircraft and missiles; provide
airspace management and navigational assistance to
friendly aircraft, and function as the alternate TACC when
directed. [Ref. 16:p. 3-1]
The TAOC performs its mission via the conduct of the
following operational functions:
• target detection, acquisition and tracking;
• target identification and classification;
• threat evaluation and weapons assignments;
• interceptor control;
• surface to air missile control;
• data communications. [Ref. 34 :p. 1-2]
These operational functions are achieved by dividing
the TAOC into three operational sections. These sections
include the weapons, surveillance and traffic sections.
a . Weapons Section
The weapons section is responsible for threat
evaluation, threat assignments and the engagement process
which includes the controlling of interceptor aircraft and
HAWK missile batteries. The weapons section is also
responsible for maintaining the status of weapons resources
and the progress of engagements. [Ref. 34 :p. IX t .3-4]
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b. Surveillance Section
The Surveillance section is responsible for the
detection, acquisition and identification of all known targets
within the designated air defense sector. The surveillance
section includes electronic warfare and data link as part of
its operational functions. [Ref. 34:p. IX-4]
c. Traffic Section
The traffic section is responsible for the control
of friendly aircraft. All fixed wing aircraft or aircraft not
under control of another agency transiting the air defense
sector will process through the TAOC. The traffic section
will normally provide an abbreviated situation report or any
other pertinent information prior to vectoring the aircraft to
proceed with its mission or handing over the aircraft to
another control agency if necessary. [Ref. 34 :p. IX - 4-5]
2. AN/TYQ-2 TAOC Equipment
AN/TYQ-2 consists of two associated equipment groups
and eight main equipment groups. Five of the main equipment
groups are operational groups and will be described in this
section. The other three, namely the AN/TYA-23, AN/TYA-27,
and the AN/TYA-25, are used as maintenance facilities and will
not be discussed. [Ref. 34:p. 1-2]
a. AN/TYA-5 Central Computer Group
The AN/TYA-5 contains the main memory and
associated logic units for the TAOC automated features that
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include automatic tracking, generation of interceptor
vectoring instructions, stored data processing for console
display and processing of digital data exchange. [Ref. 34 :p.
I - 2-3]
b. AN/TYA-18 Dimensional Radar Processor Group
The AN/TYA-18 provides two Radar IFF Data
Processors (RDIP) , one three dimensional RIDP and one two
dimensional RIDP. The RIDP is responsible for automatic
target detection and location. It is also responsible for
decoding and presentation of IFF video. This information is
sent to the AN/TYA-5 which is used to initiate a track or
update an existing track. [Ref. 34 :p. 1-3]
c. AN/TYA-9A Operator Group
The AN/TYA-9A provides the facilities for
operators to control aircraft, make assignments to missile
batteries and monitor the air picture. It houses three
universal operator consoles and four operator communication
panels. There are three AN/TYA-9A's in a AN/TYQ-2 TAOC.
[Ref. 34:p. 1-3]
d. AN/TYA-9B Supervisory Operator Group (SOG)
The AN/TYA-9B consists of a modified AN/TYA-9A and
two TYA-9B senior air director facilities. The TYA-9BS are
expandable shelters that provide facilities for monitoring and
coordinating TAOC communications and maintaining several
manually plotted status boards. [Ref. 34 :p. 1-4]
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e. AN/TYA-12 Communications Group
The AN/TYA-12 is the facility that provides
connectivity for internal and external communications. The
following communications are routed via the AN/TYA-12:
• missile battery data link;
• ground air ground data link;
• UHF voice communications;
• teletype communications;
• HF/radio relay voice communications;
• multidestination and single destination nets. [Ref . 34 :p.
1-4]
The AN/TYA-12 also contains an 80 link switchboard
which can be used for additional internal and external
communications. [Ref. 34: p. 1-4]
3. AN/TYQ-2 Associated Equipment Group
a. AN/TYA-11 Communications Central Group
The AN/TYA-11 provides five AN/GRC-171 UHF radios
for aircraft control. Three of these radios may be
channelized from the AN/TYQ-9A operator group. The TAOC
normally employs two AN/TYA-11' s. [Ref. 34 :p. 1-5]
b. AN/TYQ-3A Tactical Data Communication Central
(TDCC)
The AN/TYQ-3A provides tactical data
communications for the TAOC. It is the same equipment used by
the TACC. The TDCC provides the means to conduct data link
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operations such as HF or UHF Tactical Data Information Link-A
(TADIL-A) , ten TADIL-B/Army Tactical Data link (ATDL-1) of
which two may be Nato Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE)
link-1 and one TADIL-C, also known as Link-4A. The TDCC can
interface and translate information among links such as NADGE
and TADIL-A and/or TADIL-B. The TDCC can also provide secure
HF and UHF voice communications. [Ref. 34 :p. 1-5]
H. LIGHT ANTIAIRCRAFT MISSILE BATTALION (LAAM BN)
The LAAM BN provides medium range surface to air missile
defense for the MAGTF via the employment of Homing All the Way
Killer (HAWK) missiles against low and medium altitude air
attacks. Its command and control facility is the Battery
Command Post (BCP) . HAWK is discussed in Chapter V. It is
commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel. [Ref. 16: p. 1-2]
I. LOW ALTITUDE AIR DEFENSE BATTALION (LAAD BN)
Although the LAAD BN is not considered a C 3 system, it is
part of the overall MACCS and will be discussed in this
chapter. The LAAD BN provides close in air defense protection
for the MAGTF via the employment of the STINGER missile
system. When employed in forward combat areas, particularly
in areas not defendable by other elements of the antiair
warfare system, its mission is to destroy hostile aircraft and
unmanned aerial vehicles. [Ref. 16:p. 1-3]
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J. SUMMARY
C3 systems provide the means and the connectivity through
which the services conduct AAW. The following chapter
provides a description of weapon systems that commanders
employ via the C3 systems described earlier to conduct AAW.
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V. CURRENT WEAPON SYSTEMS
A. AIRBORNE WEAPON SYSTEMS
Since World War I (WW I) the aircraft has been the main
Antiair Warfare (AAW) weapon system. Over the years aircraft
capabilities and weapons have improved to the point that air
targets can be engaged beyond visual range with weapons of
high destructive power. This section gives a general
description of the sensors, weapon systems and the
connectivity capabilities of AAW platforms currently available
in the USN and USMC inventories.
lo F-14 TOMCAT
The F-14 is the Navy's current fleet air defense
interceptor. The TOMCAT was designed from the beginning to
carry the AWG-9/PH0ENIX AAW weapon system and variable
geometry wings to increase the envelope and performance of the
aircraft in the outer air battle around the aircraft carrier.
Production of the F-14A ended in April of 1987 after 545
aircraft had been produced. [Ref. 30:p. 91]
In the mid 1980 's a two-prong upgrade program for the
F-14A began. These upgrades were to improve performance of
the jet engines and replace most of the analog avionics suite
with digital systems. This approach led to two new variants
of the F-14, the F-14A+ (later redesignated the F-14B) and the
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F-14D. Due to the reduction of the DOD budget following the
breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolving of the USSR,
plans to remanufacture the majority of F-14A aircraft into F-
14Ds have been shelved. It is planned to have the F-14
replaced sometime after the turn of the century by the F/A-
18E/F for fleet air defense. [Ref. 30:p. 91]
a. F-14
A
Powered by two Pratt and Whitney TF3 0-P-412A or -
414A turbofans rated at 20,900 lb static thrust each, the F-
14A is capable of 912 mph at low altitudes and 1,544 mph at
altitude. It has a ceiling of 50,000 ft and a maximum range
of 2,000 miles with external fuel tanks. [Ref. 30:p. 91]
(1) Sensors. The F-14A carries the AWG-9 fire
control system which enables it to control PHOENIX and SPARROW
missiles. It is an X-band radar that can track up to 24
targets simultaneously. The AWG-9 is capable of guiding six
PHOENIX missiles against six separate targets. In non-jamming
environments it is capable of limited tracking of targets up
to 115 nm. [Ref. 23:p. 376]
(2) Connectivity. The TOMCAT is capable of
sending and receiving Tactical Data Information Link-C (TADIL-
C)
. The Link can be such that it is either a one way or two
way Link between the aircraft and the controlling platform.
It also carries several Ultra High Frequency (UHF) and Very
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High Frequency (VHF) radios for voice cominunicat ions. [Ref.
31:pp. 1-52 - 1-57]
(3) Weapons. The weapons on the F-14A are the
PHOENIX, SPARROW and SIDEWINDER Air-to-Air Missiles (AAMs) and
a 20MM gatling gun which enable it to engage hostile aircraft
or missiles. Four SPARROW or PHOENIX missiles can be carried
semi-recessed under the fuselage. Pylons under the wing root
section can carry various combinations of the three different
missiles. [Ref. 30:p. 91]
b. F-14B
Formerly known as the F-14A+, this version of the
F-14 features upgraded engines while retaining the analog
avionics of the F-14A. The two General Electric F110-GE-400
engines provide additional thrust, much increased operational
reliability and reduced fuel consumption. These new engines
also allow for non-afterburner catapult launch of the aircraft
which reduces tanking requirements. A total of 70 F-14Bs have
been acquired with 38 new construction and 32 rebuilt F-14A
aircraft. The F-14B maintains the original capabilities of




The F/A-18A is a single seat multi-role fighter
aircraft which replaced the F-4 in the fighter role and the A-
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7 in the attack role. The F/A-18B is a combat capable tandem
two seat version of the F/A-18A used for training. The F/A-
18B also has 6% less fuel capacity than the F/A-18A. The
challenge of the F-18 was optimizing a design which would
provide fairly egual capability in both the fighter and attack
role. The F-18 is a versatile aircraft that provides
excellent maneuverability for air to air engagements. Its
major disadvantage is that it has a short combat radius when
compared to other U.S. tactical fighters such as the Navy F-14
or the Air Force F-15. The F-18 is equally well suited for
its attack role with a theoretical maximum load of 17,000 lbs,
although in practice the loads are much smaller. [Ref. 35]
(1) Sensors. The F-18 employs the APG-65 multi-
mode radar which is able to track ten targets and display
eight. The cockpit of the F-18 is claimed to be one of the
most advanced with three Kaiser Cathode Ray Tube (CRT)
displays which can be used simultaneously. The F-18 also
employs an advanced Heads Up Display (HUD). [Ref. 35]
(2) Connectivity . The F-18 is data link capable
employing two way TADIL-C. It is also VHF and UHF voice
capable. [Ref. 32:p. 439]
(3) Weapons. The F-18 has nine external weapons
stations. It has fuselage mounted SPARROWS for its fighter
role with Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) and a laser tracker
for its attack role. The wingtip stations are used for
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Sidewinders for air to air engagements. An M61 20 mm six
barrel gun with approximately 57 rounds is mounted in the
nose of the F-18. The F-18 is an excellent AAW platform.
[Ref. 32:p. 439]
b. F/A-18C/D
This version of the F-18 was first purchased in
1986. The F/A-18C/D still employs the multi-role air to air
and air to ground APG-65 tracking radar. The F/A-18C/D is
data link capable employing two way TADIL-C. The F/A-18D is
the two seat version of the F-18C. [Ref. 32 :p. 439]
(1) Weapons. The F/A-18C/D are similar to the
F/A-18A/B but have provisions for up to six Advanced Medium
Range AAM (AMRAAM) weapons, two fuselage mounted and two on
each outboard wing station. It can also carry up to four
imaging infra-red Maverick missiles. It has provisions for
the AN/ALQ-165 airborne self protection jammer which is
interchangeable with the AN/ALQ-126B. Aircraft avionics has
also been upgraded. They also have the AN/AAR-50 FLIR Thermal
Imaging Navigation Set (TINS) which present TV like images on
the Kaiser AN/AVQ-28 raster heads-up display. They also
include multi-color displays and a color digital moving map
system. [Ref. 32:p. 437]
3. HARRIER II AV-8B
The AV-8B is the premier high speed, low altitude
flying, night attack capable aircraft that the Marines use for
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close air support. It is an extremely versatile aircraft that
provides flexibility for the U.S. Marine Corps. The AV-8B can
take off or land on the decks of amphibious assault ships,
roads, clearing in the woods or even bomb damaged runways.
[Ref. 36]
As of late 1990, the AV-8B has been retrofitted with
the new 408 engine which provides 23,400 lbs of thrust as
opposed to the Rolls-Royce Pegasus engine which provided
21,450 lbs of thrust. The 408 also provides twice the time
between overhauls of engines (1,000 hours). [Ref. 36]
In addition to the advantage provided by the AV-8B
ability of short take off and vertical landing (STO/VL) , which
eliminates the need for long runways, the AV-8B also requires
less ground support than other tactical fighters. The AV-8B
starts from internal power which eliminates the need for
engine-starting carts which are bulky and take up valuable
deck space, especially aboard smaller ships. [Ref. 35]
The AV-8B has proved to be an extremely effective
aircraft in its close air support but has not been exploited
in an AAW role. Although limited by its on-station time and
air to air weapons load out of four SIDEWINDERS, the AV-8B is
an excellent platform for use in a point defense role. The
AV-8B is an excellent platform for close-in engagements. It
has the ability to vector thrust while in forward flight which
allows the aircraft to perform maneuvers that are impossible
for other fighter aircraft to perform. The AV-8B can use
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tactics such as decelerating extremely quickly which will
likely cause a threat aircraft to overshoot or fly past it
while conducting an air to air engagement. [Ref. 36]
4. EA-6B PROWLER
The EA-6B PROWLER is the stand-off and penetration
jammer for the fleet. It took to the air on May 25, 1968 and
was the first aircraft in the world to be designed from the
beginning for Electronic Warfare (EW) and active Electronic
Countermeasure (ECM) . It was preceded by the EA-6A, but the
A version was an interim solution based on the two-man crew A-
6 airframe and retained a limited weapons carrying capability.
The B version has a crew of four (pilot and three ECM
officers) and has two Pratt and Whitney J52-P-408 turbojets
that provide 11,200 lbs static thrust each. It has a maximum
speed of 610 mph at sea level with a service ceiling of 38,000
ft and a range of 1,100 nm with 5 ECM pods. A total of 149
EA-6Bs have been ordered, of which 139 have been delivered as
of late 1990. The PROWLER is only capable of "soft kill"
jamming of airborne threats. [Ref. 30:p. 93]
The EA-6B initially was void of all weapons-carrying
capability. Over the years the EA-6B has received various
upgrades to its ESM and ECM equipment. These upgrades started
with the Expanded Capability (XCAP) program in 1973, followed
by the Improved Capability program starting in 1977 (ICAP I
and ICAP II) and the Block '86 program of 1988, and have all
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now reached fleet. ICAP II and Block '86 provide the PROWLER
the capability to fire HARM Anti-Radiation Missiles (ARMs)
.
The Advanced Capability program (ADVCAP) is currently
beginning its test and evaluation phase and is covered in
Chapter VIII. [Ref. 23:p. 215]
a . Sensors
The EA-6B carries the elaborate ALQ-99 tactical
support jamming system. The main group of receiving antennas
for this system is located in a large bulge on top of the
tail, giving the PROWLER a very distinctive look. The ALQ-99
system has a series of receiver antennas and signal processors
that feed a central computer with integrated displays and
jammer controls. The system allows for automatic control, if
desired, of the jamming pods by the computer. [Ref.23:p. 215]
Jb„ Connectivity
The PROWLER has no Link capability. It has only
UHF and VHF radios to relay information by voice procedures.
[Ref. 31:pp. 1-22 - 1-23]
c . Weapons
The EA-6B can counter missiles with active jamming
by the ALQ-99 jamming pods. All versions are capable of
carrying up to five different jamming pods. However, two pods
are normally replaced by fuel tanks to increase endurance.
Each pod is limited to a specific bandwidth of the threat
spectrum. [Ref. 23:p. 215]
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5. Airborne Weapons
Aircraft are normally the preferred means of engaging
hostile tracks at a safe distance from the battle group.
Since WW I, airborne weapons have continually been improved in
an effort to increase their range and lethality. We have
progressed from the hand guided bricks of the early days of WW
I to the modern semi-active radar-homing air to air missile.
These missiles can provide a standoff engagement capability,
depending on the threat, and have become the main means for
engagement for fighter aircraft. Guns, however, are carried
by all modern fighters for a close-in kill capability.
a. Air-to-Air Missiles (AAMs)
(1) AIM-54 PHOENIX. The PHOENIX is the longest
range air to air missile in operation with US forces. It is
used only by the F-14 TOMCAT. The missile receives data from
the AWG-9 fire control system prior to launch that allows it
to fly to the general vicinity of the target. An onboard auto
pilot allows the missile to fly the most efficient flight
profile to the target location. Once in the area the PHOENIX
receives semi-active illumination from the AWG-9 fire control
radar to make last second corrections to intercept the target.
Terminal homing is provided by the missile's own X band active
seeker. The AIM-54C+ has a range greater than 85 nm and can
engage targets up to 100,000 ft. It has a 133 lb warhead and
can fly at speeds up to Mach 5. [Ref. 23 :p. 418]
96
(2) AIM-7 SPARROW. SPARROW was the West's first
radar homing AAM with its design beginning in May of 1946.
Ten years later, the first production version of the AIM-7
missile (AIM-7A) entered the fleet. By the end of 1962, 2000
missiles had been produced. The SPARROW is a semi-active
missile. The AIM-7 missile has gone through numerous upgrades
since the A version. Unlike the PHOENIX, all versions prior
to the AIM-7M require illumination by an aircraft's fire
control radar for launching, tracking, and intercept. The
AIM-7M has an auto pilot giving it a range of approximately 24
nm and a speed of Mach 4 with an 86 lb warhead. [Ref. 23 :p.
425]
(3) AIM-9 SIDEWINDER. The SIDEWINDER missile is
guided by passive infrared emissions from a target. The first
missile flew in September of 1953. The most current version
of the SIDEWINDER is the AIM-9M, which is an all-aspect AAM.
Prior to the AIM-9L version, the SIDEWINDER was limited to
rear hemisphere attacks. The SIDEWINDER has a range of
approximately 20,000 yds carrying a 25 lb warhead at Mach 2.5.
[Ref. 23:p. 421]
b . Guns
(1) M61A1 VULCAN. The VULCAN 2 0MM gatling gun is
the prime gunnery air to air close-in weapon. All fighter
aircraft of the US Navy carry a version of this gun. It has
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a firing rate of 4,000 or 6,000 rounds per minute with a 570
round magazine capability. [Ref. 23 :p. 200]
B. SHIP BASED AAW SYSTEMS
During WW II naval combatants grew to become powerful air
defense weapon systems. Initially, the light caliber rapid
firing guns were the main defense against air targets, such as
kamikazes, that made it past the Combat Air Patrol (CAP) . As
missile technology developed after the war, Surface-to-Air
Missiles (SAMs) became the prime shipboard weapon against air
targets. Their stand-off engagement and destructive power
became ever important with the increasing air threat
capabilities. [Ref. 29:pp. 142-144]
This section provides a general discussion of the major
sensor and weapon systems onboard classes of USN warships and
the connectivity capabilities of USN warships. These systems
are covered because each forms a vital subsystem within the
Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS) C3 system of a warship.
Several systems are not included. These systems are in
classes of ships that are due to be decommissioned, have
extremely limited capability, and/or are inappropriate for
this topic. The class of ships not covered are: aircraft
carriers, auxiliaries, classes that are due to be
decommissioned by 1994 (KNOX, COONTZ, CHARLES F. ADAMS,
TRUXTON, etc.), and amphibious ships.
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1. Ship Surveillance systems
Most USN warships have several different systems for
detecting aircraft. The most common systems are air search
radars. There are two types of air search radar systems.
They are two (2D) and three (3D) dimensional systems. 2D
radars provide only bearing and range information on an air
track. 3D radars provide bearing, range and height
information. Surface search radars have been proven to be
adequate systems for detecting low flying aircraft at short
range. Since these systems are not designed for detecting
aircraft they are not discussed in this paper. [Ref. 33 :p. 9]
EW systems can also provide important early warning of
hostile aircraft and missiles. Most Electronic Warfare (EW)
systems provide an Electronic Support Measures (ESM)
capability in detecting emissions from aircraft and missile
radars. These systems are usually limited in the frequency
range they can monitor and are only now being automatically
integrated into the tactical data systems of US warships.
[Ref. 23:p. 475]
a. SPS-48
The SPS-48 series radar systems provide height,
bearing and range information on airborne targets. It is the
most sophisticated 3D frequency scanning rotating air search
radar on US warships. This S-band radar scans multiple beams
in elevation to combine long range with high data rate and
99
multiple pulses to increase probability of detection in
jamming environments. The antenna is electronically
stabilized against pitch and roll up to 20 degrees. It
provides detection out to 220 nm and up to 100,000 ft. The
maximum elevation angle is limited to 45 degrees except for
the SPS-48E version which provides coverage up to 65 degrees
elevation. The 45 degree limit does cause a considerable
blind zone immediately above the ship. Several cruise
missiles are designed to take advantage of this blind zone.
[Ref. 23:pp. 332-333]
b. SPS-49
The SPS-49 2D radar provides secondary air target
data for most guided missile ships. They are long range,
early warning L-band radars. The system is capable of
providing detections out to 250 nm and has become the standard
2D radar for the USN. [Ref. 33:p. 9]
The SPS-49 radar set achieves excellent performance in the
presence of severe land and weather clutter, and active
electronic countermeasures and chaff, by means of adaptive
digital Moving Target Indicator (MTI) techniques,
selectable pulse repetition frequencies, high transmitting
pulse energy (through pulse compression) , narrow antenna
beamwidth, frequency agility, coherent sidelobe
cancellation, constant false alarm rate (CFAR) , and other
anti-jamming circuitry. [Ref. 36:p. 36]
c. SPS-40
The SPS-40 is an older series of air search radar
and has only marginal capability in a jamming environment.
This L band radar system is a compromise between very long
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range (achieved by using low frequency) and reasonable
definition. Later versions of the SPS-40 have a Low Flyer
Detection Mode (LFDM) , digital MTI (DMTI) and an Automatic
Target Detector (ATD) that allows automatic integration with
a ship's tactical data system. The SPS-40 is being replaced
by the SPS-49 as the primary 2D air search radar for the USN.
[Ref. 23:p. 332]
d. AEGIS
All AEGIS ships carry four phased-array SPY-1 3D
radars. Each array is a 12 ft by 12 ft octagon with 140
array modules. Each module contains 32 radiating elements
driven by eight transmitters. There is a slight overlap in
coverage of each array's sector to ensure 360 degree coverage.
This S band radar system provides virtually continuous updates
of all tracks due to dipole radiation to secure an electronic
sweep versus actual radar rotation on other systems. The
AEGIS system normally makes one horizon scan and 12 scans
above the horizon every minute. SPY-1 can provide detection
of aircraft out to approximately 2 00 nm and performs extremely




The SLQ-32 (V) series is the standard ship ESM and
ECM system. As originally designed, it comes in three basic
versions. SLQ-32 (V) 1 is installed on auxiliaries and
amphibious ships. It provides radar warning on H through J
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bands. It has no active ECM capability. All Vis are
eventually to be upgraded to the V2 version. The SLQ-32(V)2
provides ESM for B through J bands and is installed on
frigates and destroyers. This version also has no active ECM
capabilities. SLQ-32(V)3 is described later in this Chapter.
The SLQ-32 is of a modular design that allows for relatively
easy (though very expensive) upgrading from one variant to the
next. [Ref. 23:pp. 528-529]
2 . Ship Weapons
a . Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs)
The 3 "T" programs generated the first SAMs to be
used operationally by the Navy. The TALOS and TERRIER long
range missiles were destined to serve aboard larger ships due
to their size. The TARTAR short range missiles were fitted
primarily aboard frigates and destroyers. It was proven to be
very expensive to operate three separate missile systems that
were designed to do the same thing. Because of this, it was
decided to create a "standard" missile that had the best
features of all three "T" missiles. The missile is called
STANDARD. It is made in two versions, Medium Range (MR) and
Extended Range (ER) . The MR has replaced the TARTAR and the
ER has replaced the TERRIER. [Ref. 33:pp. 4-5]
(1) RIM-66 Standard Missile-MR. The original
version of this family of missiles is the SM-1MR. The RIM-66B
carries a 137 lb continuous rod warhead to maximum range of 25
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nm and a maximum altitude of 80,000 ft. These are known as
home-all-the-way missiles. They require illumination of the
target from launch to interception. With these missiles they
are always pointing towards the target and therefore are not
kinematically efficient. Additionally, the continuous rod
warhead combined with the target detection device that
detonates the warhead tend to react too late for the smaller,
faster moving air targets. The latest version of this SAM is
the SM-1MR (BLK VI). [Ref. 23:pp. 401-402]
In order to improve on the major drawbacks of
the SM-1 series the SM-2 series was developed. The SM-2 took
the SM-1 airframe and modified several components in order to
vastly improve its overall capabilities. Known as the RIM-
66C, the SM-2MR has vastly increased capabilities. With an
onboard auto-pilot and incorporated inertial navigation, the
missile is flown out to the predicted point of interception of
the target. This allows the missile to fly a much more
efficient flight path. Since the missile can fly without
target illumination, the aircraft is unaware that it is being
targeted until the missile is in its terminal phase. The SM-
2MR has a range of 45 nm. [Ref. 23:pp. 403-404]
Since the SM-2MR was developed it has been
further modified in blocks (BLKs) . SM-2MR (BLK I) has an
improved mono-pulse seeker that helps counter self-screening
jamming. SM-2MR (BLK II) carries an improved booster motor
that greatly increases its kinematic envelope. The BLK II has
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a range approaching 90 nm. It also carries a fragmentation
warhead with a new Target Detection Device (TDD) that is
designed for high closing speed intercepts. Future BLKs for
the SM-2MR are discussed in Chapter VIII. [Ref. 23 :p. 404]
(2) RIM-67 Standard Missile-ER. The ER missile
has a high percentage of commonality with the airframe of the
MR missile. The most visual difference is the large booster
attached at the tail which greatly increases range and
kinematic energy. The SM-1ER has a range of 45 nm and carries
a 250 lb warhead at Mach 3. The RIM-67s have received the
same modifications given to the MR as described above. SM-2ER
is designated RIM-67B and has a range of 90 nm. SM-2ER (BLK
II) has a range of approximately 115 nm. Future BLKs for the
SM-2ER are described in Chapter VIII. [Ref. 23:pp. 403-404]
(3) RIM-7 SEA SPARROW. First developed in 1963
from the AIM-7E, the RIM-7H was designed to provide defense
against low flying attackers. Modifications included rapid
run up, folding wings and clipped tail fins. These were
determined to be inadequate for the task. The RIM-7M is a
AIM-7M with improved fuzing (adapting to low altitude
clutter) , and a self-destruct feature to prevent homing on
friendly ships. An onboard auto pilot provides for a more
efficient flight profile and kinematic energy to intercept the
target. The range of the RIM-7M is up to 24 nm. [Ref. 23:pp.
424-425]
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(4) FIM-92 STINGER. The STINGER missiles used
aboard naval combatants are the exact same missiles used by
the Marines. Specially trained detachments are normally
embarked onboard ships on deployment to provide a STINGER
capability. It is fully described in the Land Based Weapon
Systems section.
Jb . Guns
Though no longer the main weapon for naval ships
in AAW, guns still provide the last ditch effort to bring down
close in targets. This is provided by small caliber rapid
firing guns. Large caliber guns still provide a capability to
engage low flying aircraft and helicopters at relatively
moderate speeds. Large caliber guns are normally designated
by diameter, caliber and Mark (design designation) . An
example would be the 5 inch 38 caliber Mark 3 which would be
referred to as 5"/38 MK30. [Ref. 29:pp. 63-81]
(1) 5"/54 MK42 . The 5"/54 MK42 was conceived as
a single gun replacement for the venerable WW II twin 5"/38
gun mount. It achieved the same firing rate as the 5"/ 38 with
a more powerful round. Initially capable of firing 40 rounds
a minute, it had to be derated to 28 rounds per minute for
safety reasons. It has a 40 round ready service drum that
allows the rounds carried to be selectively loaded to fire the
desired type of shell. It has a maximum range of just under
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15 nm and requires a 13 man crew to operate the entire system.
[Ref. 23:pp. 459-460]
(2) 5"/ 54 MK45. The MK45 is a slower firing gun
mount that replaces the MK42. It fires 17 rounds per minute
at a range slightly less than 15 nm. The MK45 has a single 20
round ready service drum and has an automatic fuse setter. It
is capable of firing guided shells and has a much lower
manning requirement than the MK42 as only six personnel are
required to operate this gun system. Compared to the MK 42,
the MK45 has a greatly simplified operating mechanism. The
gun mount itself is completely unmanned. [Ref. 23 :p. 460]
(3) 3"/'62 MK76. The MK7 6 automatic gun has an
extremely high rate of fire. Its 80 round ready service
magazine provides 1 minute of sustained fire. Due to its size
and fixed ammunition, it is unable to fire the more
sophisticated types of shells as the five inch guns do. It
takes three personnel to operate this unmanned gun mount.
[Ref. 23:pp. 462-463]
(4) 20MM MK15 PHALANX. The PHALANX is the
standard Navy Close-in Weapon System (CIWS) providing point
defense. It fires 20 mm discarding sabot, depleted uranium
penetrators designed to destroy or destabilize the missile's
warhead, seeker, or airframe. It carries 999 rounds in a
ready service drum immediately under the gatling gun. With a
firing rate of 1,000 to 3,000 rounds per minute, it is only
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capable of a few engagements before the ready service drum
must be reloaded. The gun system is capable of fully
autonomous operation against high speed closing air targets.
[Ref. 23:p. 467]
The MK90 FCS is located above the gatling gun
and provides a closed loop firing circuit. Once the mount
begins to fire, the out-going rounds are tracked by the FCS.
The gun mount is adjusted as necessary to ensure that the out
going stream of bullets meet the incoming target. This system
is very effective against low flying targets. [Ref. 23 :p.
468]
c. Countermeasures
(1) SLQ-32 (V) . The SLQ-32 (V) series is the
standard USN ship EW system. As originally designed, it comes
in three basic versions. SLQ-32 (V) 1 and 2 were described
earlier. The SLQ-32 (V) 3 provides radar warning on B through
J bands and jamming/deception on H through J bands. It has
been found that the SLQ-32 (V) 1 and 2 are critically deficient
with no active ECM capability. Several of the V2 systems have
been upgraded with the SIDEKICK system to give them limited
ECM capability. SIDEKICK and future upgrades of the SLQ-32
are covered in Chapter VIII. [Ref. 23:pp. 528-531]
(2) MK3 6 SRBOC Launcher. This six tube mortar is
capable of launching chaff and flares or combined rounds to
confuse radar and heat seeking Antiship Missiles (ASMs)
.
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Ships normally carry a total of four launchers, with two on
either side of the ship. Depending on the loading of the
tubes and the type of threat, these four launchers can provide
up to four separate salvos to deter ASM lock on. [Ref. 23:pp.
544-545]
(3) SLQ-49 RUBBER DUCK Decoy. This is the USN
version of the British DLF floating decoys. They are
essentially floating rafts with radar deflectors that greatly
enhance their radar signature to lure ASM from their intended
target. Two floats are normally launched per salvo and are
considered to be effective up to three hours in sea state
four. The launchers for the SLQ-49 are not normally carried
unless a ship is on deployment. [Ref. 23:pp. 524-525]
3. Ship Connectivity
Modern US warships have a large range of communication
assets. Through the use of various receivers, transmitters
and transceivers operating in the Low Frequency (30-300 KHZ)
,
Medium Frequency (300-3000 KHZ) , High Frequency (3-30 MHZ)
,
VHF (30-300 MHZ), UHF (300-3000 MHZ), and Super High Frequency
(3-30 GHZ) bands, the ships provide connectivity to a large
range of C 3 systems [Ref. 37:p. 1-3]. These include (but are
not limited to)
:
• Fleet Broadcast (generic message traffic)
;
• Fleet Satellite Communications (FLTSATCOM)
;
• Common User Digital Information Exchange System (CUDIXS)
;
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• Officer-in-Tactical Command Exchange System (OTCIXS)
;
• Tactical Intelligence Network (TACINTEL)
;
• Tactical Digital Information Exchange System (TADIXS)
;
• Tactical Data Information Link A (TADIL-A)
;
• Tactical Data Information Link C (TADIL-C)
• Tactical Data Information Link J (TADIL-J) . [Ref. 23:p.
23]
The last three communication systems are used
primarily for the data exchange between units for the Naval
Tactical Data System (NTDS) . The other communication systems
provide various information from within and outside of the
Battle Force, but generally are not integrated with a C3
system like NTDS to distribute AAW information throughout the
force. [Ref. 23:pp. 22-23]
C. LAND BASED WEAPON SYSTEMS
1. Point defense
a. FIM-92 STINGER
The STINGER is a shoulder-fired manportable
missile which provides effective short range air defense
capabilities for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force
against low level fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. It is
the weapon of choice for low altitude air defense for the U.S.
and allied forces. [Ref. 38:p. 333]
The STINGER is a 35 pound supersonic fire and
forget missile which replaced the REDEYE and has the ability
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to engage aircraft approaching from any direction, including
head-on. The missile's speed, range, maneuverability, flight
tracking and countermeasures rejection capability has made it
possible to counter even the most sophisticated threat
aircraft. [Ref. 38:p. 333]
There are three variants of STINGER. These are
the basic STINGER FIM-92A, STINGER POST (Passive Optical
Seeker Technique) FIM-92B, and the STINGER RMP (Reprogrammable
Microprocessor) FIM-92C.
(1) Characteristics . All three systems operate in
a similar fashion. They have the following characteristics:
• all use the rolling airframe concept;
• proportional navigation;
• passive homing;
• separate launch motor;
• penetrating hit to kill warhead;
• reusable launcher grip stock;
• IFF (Identification Friend or Foe). [Ref. 30:p. 333]
The basic STINGER has an IR reticle-scan analog
system which uses discrete component signal processing. The
STINGER-POST uses a dual detector both IR and ultraviolet
rosette-pattern image scanning to improve target detection.
It also uses a digital microprocessor for signal processing.
The STINGER-POST provides improved acquisition and false
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target rejection by discrimination between a target and any
deployed IR flares and background clutter. [Ref. 30:p. 333]
The STINGER-RMP provided additional microprocessor
power and is much more resistant to countermeasures. The
microprocessor can be periodically updated with new software
to counter emerging threat technology instead of having to
redesign the missile each time. [Ref. 30:p. 333]
(2) Specifications . The complete launcher weighs
15.7 kg. The missile has an effective range of 8000 meters
with a maximum speed of Mach 2.2. The FIM-92A and FIM-92B
have a less effective range of 4000 and 4500 meters
respectively. The minimum effective range is 200 meters.
STINGER has a maximum altitude of 3800 meters with a minimum
being effectively ground level. [Ref. 39:p. 54]
2 » Area defense
a. HAWK
HAWK (Homing All the Way Killer) is a semi-active
radar-seeking medium range Surface to Air Missile (SAM) . HAWK
has been incrementally improved in various phases since its
introduction to the Marine Corps in 1960 to counter an
increasing threat capability. These improvements have brought
about better capability, reliability and maintainability.
[Ref. 40: p. 15]
Phase I which was fielded in 1981 included an
Improved Continuous Wave (CW) Acquisition Radar (ICWAR)
,
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addition of a digital Moving Target Indicator (MTI) to the
Pulse Acguisition Radar (PAR) , and inclusion of Army Tactical
Data Link (ATDL) communications within the system. [Ref.
39:p. 275]
Phase II Product Improvement Program (PIP)
upgrades commenced in 1978 and employed in 1983. Vacuum-tube
circuits were replaced with modern solid state technology in
the High Power Illumination (HPI) radar which greatly improved
its reliability. A Tracking Adjunct System (TAS) optical
tracking system for operations in an ECM environment was added
to the HPI radar. The Battery Control Center (BCC) circuits
were also replaced by solid state technology. [Ref. 39:p.275]
The phase III PIP upgrades started developments in
1981 and is currently in production for the U.S. armed forces.
Phase III upgrades include major modifications to many of the
system's major equipment. The Range Only Radar (ROR) and the
Information Coordination Center (ICC) have been deleted from
the system. The BCC has been replaced by the Battery Command
Post (BCP) . The BCP is where firing operations are monitored
and controlled for a platoon. The BCP contains an Automatic
Data processor (ADP) , a Second Data Processor (SDP) , a
Tactical Display and Engagement Control Console (TDECC) , IFF
and communications equipment. Major electronic modification
including incorporation of distributed microprocessors and
enhanced computer software were made on the BCP, PCP, CWAR and
HPI. [Ref. 39:p. 276]
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The most noted change brought about by Phase III
includes the addition of a single scan target detection
capability and Low Altitude HAWK Engagement (LASHE) added to
the HPI . This is done by employing a fan beam antenna which
provides a wide angle, low altitude illumination pattern to
allow multiple engagements against saturation raids. [Ref.
39:p. 276]
Phase III HAWK can be fielded in three
configurations. These include an Assault Fire Platoon (AFP)
,
an AFP plus and a Battery. The AFP will be composed of a
CWAR, PCP, HPI and four launchers which contain three missiles
each. The AFP plus is identical to the AFP except with the
addition of a PAR. The Battery contains a CWAR, PAR, BCP, two
HPI's and four M192 launchers. [Ref. 39:p. 276]
The CWAR provides low to medium altitude target
detection in the presence of high-level ground clutter. It
provides target azimuth, range and range rate. Its detection
range is approximately 30 nautical miles with a max altitude
of approximately 10,000 ft. [Ref. 40:p. 6]
The PAR compliments the CWAR by providing volume
search coverage. The PAR provides both target azimuth and
range but not altitude. Its detection range is approximately
40 nautical miles with a max altitude of 50,000 ft. [Ref.
40:p. 6]
The HPI is a three dimensional continuous wave
radar which automatically tracks and illuminate targets for
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engagement. It is a more direct radar using a pencil-like beam
to illuminate targets. When in the LASHE mode, the HPI can
operate as a wide angle illuminator for multiple low altitude,
short range target engagements. The HPI also has a limited
surveillance capability in a small sector when faced with a
stand off jammer threat. [Ref. 40:p. 6]
(1) Advantages. HAWK provides the Marine Air
Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander with several capabilities.
It provides all weather 24 hour low altitude detection at
ranges in excess of 20 miles. It employs a high performance
lethal missile which performs well in an ECM environment.
[Ref. 40:p. 15]
(2) Disadvantages
As with all weapon systems, HAWK has its
limitations. A planner must be aware of these limitations as
follows:
• Mobility - HAWK is a relatively mobile system. It is out
of action every time it moves to a new location. This out
of action time is composed of system preparation time to
move, traveling time to the new site and system
emplacement time once at the new site.
• Positive identification - The Tactical Officers' (TO)
ability to properly classify aircraft is limited to the
capabilities of his equipment. The TO relies on IFF
equipment and established procedures for identification
purposes. The identification problem becomes extremely
difficult when you include other factors such as the "fog
of war".
• Anti-Radiation Missile (ARM) vulnerability - As with many
systems that emit radiation energy, HAWK is susceptible to
the ARM threat.
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• Firepower - The addition of LASHE has significantly helped
HAWK's previous limitation of engaging only one aircraft
per HPI. LASHE, however, can only engage low flying
targets within the beamwidth of the CW and in ranges
within 15 KM.
• Missile signature - HAWK missiles create a highly visible
backblast when fired, especially in dry, dusty areas. This
cloud of smoke and dust will assist a threat pilot in
locating the missile unit, as well as possibly give him
reaction time to avoid missile intercept. The HAWK system
also produces significant infrared, electronic, visual and
audio signatures.
• Terrain/Radar masking - Terrain limits HAWK capabilities
by causing radar masking. Irregularities in the terrain
create areas where aircraft can fly undetected.
• Terrain slope and firmness - The terrain for HAWK
employment must be fairly level and firm with adequate
drainage. It must be firm enough to support the heavier
pieces of HAWK equipment.
• Access - A HAWK unit requires substantial support for
maintenance, repair parts, fuel and general supplies. This
requires roads to and from the site, as well as within the
site. If roads do not exist or unsuitable for travel, a
helipad must be constructed for air delivery of support.
[Ref. 40:pp. 15-16]
It is important to understand the basic
capabilities of HAWK since the system is deployed worldwide in
over twenty countries. It is conceivable that U.S. aviators
may find themselves flying against this system by a once
friendly nation that may have turned hostile. It is important
to note that Iran also employs HAWK, but they are no longer
supported by Raytheon. Iraq also has HAWK which were captured
from Kuwait. [Ref. 40:pp. 15-16]
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D. SUMMARY
The Navy and Marine Corps possess an array of modern
weaponry that can be successfully employed in the conduct of
AAW. Realizing the capabilities and limitations of current
weapon systems allows a commander to effectively employ his
assets to maximize their capabilities and minimize their
limitations. The next chapter discusses proposed concepts and
doctrine that may be employed as viable paradigms for future
operations.
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VI. FUTURE CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE
A. FUTURE ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND
1. Space and Electronic Warfare Commander (SEWC)
The SEWC is a relatively new commander within the
Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) structure. SEWC is
responsible for coordinating all non-organic information
coming into the Battle Force and ensuring that the information
gets to the appropriate warfare commanders. Space and
Electronic Warfare (SEW) brings new strategic sensors and
assets not directly assigned to the Officer in Tactical
Command (OTC) into the dominion of the Battle Force. The
ability SEW has to provide tangible information from organic
and non-organic information in an organized fashion within a
capable C3 system will greatly enhance the tactical options
and perspective of the OTC and his warfare commanders. [Ref.
l:p. 8]
2. CATF, CWC, and Amphibious Doctrine
The controversy between CWC and amphibious doctrine is
relatively new. One attempt at resolving the C3 issues
between CWC and amphibious doctrine is COMTHIRDFLT TACMEMO
PZ1010-1-88 Composite Warfare Procedures for Amphibious
Operations. The TACMEMO proponents claim current amphibious
doctrine is outdated. [Ref. 41:p. 20]
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The COMTHIRDFLT TACMEMO tries to provide unity of
command for an amphibious operation and eliminate the need for
two separate CWC organizations. [Ref. 41:p. 21]
It does this by renaming CATF as Amphibious Warfare
Commander (AMWC) and placing him under the OTC's CWC
organization.
The TACMEMO eliminates the term CATF and makes the CWC
responsible for the amphibious mission. CATF/CLF become
warfare commanders. [Ref. 41:p. 20]
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Figure 16 CWC Proposed Organization [Ref. 41:p. 21]
Proponents of the TACMEMO feel that since the primary
mission of the OTC is to conduct an amphibious operation, he
will be willing to provide the amphibious commander the assets
he needs to accomplish the mission and will also provide
protection of the ATF. [Ref. 41:p. 22}
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COMTHIRDFLT TACMEMO PZ1010-1-91 attempts to reconcile
the first edition with joint amphibious doctrine. The AMWC is
once again denoted as CATF. The TACMEMO incorporates the term
Commmander Marine Forces (COMMARFOR) taken from JOINT Pub 5-
00.2. The COMMARFOR is made senior to the CLF and co-equal to
the COMNAVFOR who is the OTC.
3. Amphibious Defence Zone Coordinator (ADZC)
The ADZC doctrine is proposed in Commander, Surface
Warfare Development Group TACMEMO PZ3010-1-88. This TACMEMO
"trys to integrate air defense of the Amphibious Ojective
Area (AOA) into the overall battle force/fleet air defense
plan. Under this concept air defense of the Amphibious
Task Force (ATF) and of the Carrier Battle Group (CVBG)
are treated as interconnected subsets of the same problem.
[Ref. 17:p. 2-1]
This coordinator is the AAWC within the CATF ' s CWC
command and is a Sector AAWC (SAAWC) within the OTC's CWC
command. As a SAAWC, it is subordinate to the Force AAWC
(FAAWC) and responsible for both the ATF ' s part of the AOA
(seaward sector) and the beach head and landing zones
(landward sector) of the AOA. As AAWC for the CATF, he is
responsible for the air defense of the AOA and obtaining the
required aircraft from the Air Resources Coordinator (AREC) of
the Battle Force via the FAAWC to accomplish the mission and
controls all Marine air assets assigned to the ATF. See
Figure 17. [Ref. 17:p. 2-2]
With this concept, the ADZC is responsible for both
the landward and seaward sectors of the AOA until Marine Corps
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air defense C2 assets transition ashore. Once a Tactical Air
Operations Center (TAOC) is established, it becomes a SAAWC
for the landward sector within the ADZC's sector of
responsibility. The ADZC is still responsible to the FAAWC
for the actions of the TAOC. When significant Marine Corps
forces are ashore and the TACC transfers ashore, the
responsibilities of ADZC shift with it. The TACC becomes the
Battle Force SAAWC for the AOA and becomes the CATF AAWC for
the ATF. The ship that performed the duties of ADZC normally
becomes a SAAWC for the TACC/ADZC responsible for the seaward
sector of the AOA. The TACC/ADZC, however, is now responsible
to the FAAWC for the actions of this SAAWC. This concept













Figure 17 ADZC CWC Concept [Ref. 17 :p. 5-2]
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The ADZC is known as a coordinator rather than a
commander because of the massive coordination he undertakes
when the landings are actually being conducted. All aircraft
from the carriers and the amphibious ships going into the AOA
must be coordinated with the ADZC to ensure that friendly
aircraft are not mistakenly engaged. [Ref. 17: p. EX-1]
B. JOINT AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS (JADO)
1. Joint Engagement Zone (JEZ)
There are proponents who feel that the present air
defense structure employing the FEZ/MEZ concept is too
restrictive and does not allow for maximum exploitation by air
defense weapon systems.
This concept defines a Joint Engagement Zone as airspace
of specific dimensions within which multiple air defense
weapon systems (SAMs and friendly fighters) of one or more
services are simultaneously employed and operated. [Ref.
42:p. H-12]
The concept relies on having systems that can provide
Positive Hostile Identification (PHID) . It also relies on
having a fusion center that can provide the command and
control necessary to effectively assign engagement of hostile
air threats. [Ref. 42:p. H-12]
The purpose is to provide a more flexible system that
supports both ground based and airborne air defense systems.
It is designed to effectively employ air defense weaponry and
reduce fratricide. [Ref. 42 :p. H-12]
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The JEZ concept is relatively new dating back to 1986.
There have been several field tests conducted to assess the
JEZ concept both in Europe and the United States. So far, no
final conclusions have been made [Ref. 43], Presently,
further test and evaluation is being conducted to verify if
JEZ is a viable concept for future operations.
C. SUMMARY
This chapter has reviewed the addition of a new warfare
commander, the SEWC, to the CWC. This commander has the
responsibility of integrating non-organic intelligence with
the organic tactical data of a Battle Force and ensuring its
timely distribution to the appropriate users. The ability to
integrate this bountiful resource of data to the users can
lead to significant increases in early warning of hostile
actions against the Battle Force by enemy air actions.
Three proposed changes to amphibious doctrine have been
reviewed. The proposal by COMTHIRDFLT to have the CATF
integrated into the OTC ' s CWC as AMWC attempts to meld an
integration of CVBG CWC and the CATF s CWC. Although this
does integrate the two currently separate command structures,
it greatly reduces the authority of the CATF and degrades his
ability to accomplish the mission. The ADZC concepts attempt
to integrate the two CWC structures solely in the area of AAW.
This allows for the coordination of the AAW picture into a
single picture while allowing the CATF to maintain his
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authority and ability to accomplish the mission. The JEZ
proposal tries to integrate the actual AAW battle by allowing
both missile and aircraft engagements in any particular
location depending which asset is better suited at any given
time to conduct the engagement. This concept requires much
coordination and an ability to positively identify friendly
aircraft from hostile aircraft. Although this concept makes
best use of the available assets, it is still to be shown that
current or future C3 systems can support it.
The following chapter reviews future C3 systems with
regard to their capabilities and limitations and discusses how
they might support future paradigm changes.
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VII. FUTURE C3 SYSTEMS
A. ADVANCED COMBAT DIRECTION SYSTEM (ACDS)
The Advanced Combat Direction System (ACDS) is the
successor to Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS) and the interim
Combat Direction System (CDS) C3 systems. ACDS is currently
entering the fleet in two different versions (called blocks)
.
Block is limited in track capacity, surveillance range and
track identification description. The system's ability to
gridlock to the Data Link Reference Point (DLRP) is limited to
self correlation. It is also limited in its ability to
integrate Electronic Support Measure (ESM) and Antisubmarine
Warfare (ASW) data. Most importantly, like its two
predecessors, it is not designed to automate the decision to
engage a target and does not greatly reduce a ship's reaction
time. [Ref. 23:p. 81]
Compared to NTDS, Block 1 offers expanded environment
coverage, automated sensor processing, four times as many
track files, and much more expanded data exchange. This C 3
system allows not only for automated data exchange within a
Battle Force, but also with external sources of information.
ACDS Block 1 also represents a shift in paradigm for human
involvement in the engagement decision. With its use of
Automatic Combat System Checklists (ACSCLs) , the system is
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able to enact predetermined actions for very exacting
situations. Once the system detects the appropriate
conditions, its doctrinal processing implements the actions
previously designated by the Commanding Officer (CO) or the
OTC's staff for that situation. The TAO receives a display of
the actions to be taken and can veto them when necessary.
[Ref. 23:p. 82]
1. Facilities
ACDS is planned to be retrofitted on all aircraft
carriers and TICONDEROGA class cruisers. The Arleigh Burke
class destroyers and LHD class amphibious assault ships are to
receive them during construction. With the reductions of the
military budget during the 1990' s, it is doubtful that any
further retrofits to older ships will take place. [Ref. 44]
2 o Equipment
The equipment within ACDS is based primarily on new
and vastly improved military computers designed with 1980 's
technology. The new UYK-43 and UYK-44 computers replace the
1960's UYK-7 and UYK-20 computers. It is claimed that the
UYK-43 is the most dependable military computer yet developed,
with a Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) of 56,000 HRS. The
UYK-44 is claimed to have an MTBF of 13,000 HRS. Both
computers greatly improve upon the word length, memory, speed,
instructions per second, and input/output (I/O) capabilities
of their predecessors. [Ref. 23 :p. 40]
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ACDS also allows a tremendous improvement in the
display of tactical information. Automated Status Boards
(ASTABs) complement the usual console graphics. The overall
computer system keeps the entire ASTAB up to date
continuously, including track and intelligence data. ACDS has
60 predefined formats for own ship and force data and allows
for 20 user defined formats to meet any particular desires of
a commander. Graphic display at consoles and at Large Screen
Displays (LSDs) have been made much more detailed than those
of the past and are integrated with the ACSCLs. This makes it
relatively easy to comprehend the ACSCLs requirements, the
tactical picture, and various boundaries that effect the
tactical situation. For example, the system may be set to
react to an aircraft that is outside the 12 NM limit of a
country. The graphics can display the coast line of the
country, the track of the aircraft, the 12 NM limit across the
entire coast line, the location and time of the aircraft
crossing the boundary, and a list of actions the system will
take when the aircraft crosses that point. It is with this
system that the paradigm of sole human involvement in the
engagement decision has changed as the computer takes on part
of the Threat Evaluation and Weapons Assignment (TEWA)
responsibilities previously done only by the TAO and CO. This
is the first system to incorporate an on-line intelligence




Communications within the ACDS C3 system are greatly
improved over NTDS. This system allows for the inclusion of
voice reports, sensor data (especially integrated ESM data)
,
tactical data Links, and outside intelligence to be brought
directly into the system [Ref. 45:pp. 10-11]. This is
normally done through the Net Control Station (NECOS)
.
Link communications will greatly improve with the use
of TADIL-J (Link 16) . Link 16 is designed to replace Link 4A
and complement Link 11. This is considered a jam resistant
Link. Additionally, TADIL-J is capable of a ten fold increase
in data throughput in its net compared to Link 11. This Link
will also increase the interoperability of this C3 system,
because it is to be adopted by the Army, Air Force, Navy and
Marine Corps as the common data exchange protocol. [Ref.
23:p. 19]
Although Link 16 seems to be "just what the chef
ordered" in terms of a modern Link for the US military, it is
not coming into operation as quickly as one might think. The
lack of inter-service coordination and sky rocketing costs
during a period of greatly reduced defense budgets has caused
the system to be delayed and drawn out in its development and
acceptance by the different armed forces. As was shown in the
Desert Storm connectivity for AAW C3 systems, TADIL-J
actually added an additional Link that was not interoperable
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with any of the other Links in use. See Figure 13. This was
the exact opposite of one of its primary reasons for
development. [Ref. 28]
B. COPERNICUS
Copernicus is a program that is designed to articulate the
architecture reguired for a C3 system for the 21st Century.
It is attempting to accomplish several different tasks.
First, it is to provide for new technologies that integrate
numerous tactical and strategic sensors, facilitate tactical
decision making and provide solutions to communications
capacity and interoperability problems. Secondly, it is to
build an organizational infrastructure and doctrine to
integrate both modern war at sea and crises management in the
context of Navy operations as well as Joint/Combined
operations. [Ref. l:p. 1]
Even with ACDS Block 1, Battle Forces are limited to the
integration of only their organic sensors. This limits them
to an environment limited to approximately 500 nm in
horizontal range, 100,000 ft above the surface of the water
and approximately 1 nm beneath the sea. It is envisioned that
Copernicus can dramatically increase the range of the
environment that its C 3 process covers with the integration of
non-organic sensors (such as satellites) and other C 3 systems.
It is believed that the Battle Force environment can be
expanded to 5,000 miles horizontally, 23,500 miles above the
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oceans and to the limits of our current and future underwater
surveillance systems. [Ref. l:p. 8]
C. ADVANCED TACTICAL AIR COMMAND CENTER (ATACC)
The ATACC is a completely new system that will replace the
current TACC system. The system will no longer be housed in
an inflatable container. Instead, the ATACC will be housed in
an 8ft x 8ft x 20ft shelter and weigh approximately 10,0001bs.
The shelter renders protection against electromagnetic
interference and signal interception. It will also provide
protection from biological and chemical warfare. Each shelter
will accommodate five work stations and two communications
processors. It will also contain display and data storage,
and voice communications for both external and internal use.
The ATACC provides flexibility in allowing workstations and
communications distribution terminals to be relocated outside
of the shelters and operated remotely if needed. [Ref. 46]
Individual shelters can be electrically connected in order
to provide increased capability. The system is designed to be
fielded as a suite. Two shelters linked together form a
suite. Figure 18 depicts a suite configuration. A suite will
support a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) size operation.
Two suites linked together form a Marine Expeditionary Force
(MEF) TACC. [Ref. 46]
The ATACC provides a vast improvement in computer software
which allows faster and finer information processing. A
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Figure 18 ATACC [Ref. 48]
database is provided which is automatically updated by
messages received from TADIL-A, TADIL-B, NATO Link-1,
Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) and Marine Tactical System
(MTS) . The system employs software driven menu screens on
operator work stations that are easy to use. Commands,
command options and command explanations are all displayed
when accessed, reducing operator dependence on user manuals.
Work stations are accommodated with a Voice Communications
Distribution Set (VCDS) . These provide operators with the
ability to access radios, cryptographic equipment, telephone
lines and intercommunications via Operator Control Units
130
(OCU's) . Up to 40 radios, 16 telephone lines, four secure
telephone devices and 24 intercommunications stations can be
accessed through the OCU. The ATACC will provide the MAGTF
commander improved mobility, capability and reliability.
[Ref. 46]
D. AN/TYQ-2 3 TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS MODULE (TAOM)
The TAOM is an air, land, and sea transportable automated
air command and control system designed for controlling and
coordinating the employment of aircraft and air defense
weapons. A single fully populated TAOM is housed in an 8ft x
8ft x 20ft International Standard Organization (ISO) shelter
and weighs under 17,0001bs. It is transportable via
helicopter, ship, truck and fixed wing aircraft. Figure 19 is
a depiction of the system including its equipment location.
[Ref. 47:p. 81]
The TAOM system is a ground based system that will provide
the TAOC with the hardware and software needed to fulfill the
antiair warfare mission requirements of the Marine Corps. The
TAOM system and associated sensors, air defense weapons and
communication equipment will provide an air defense/air
control capability for all levels of the MAGTF to counter the
anticipated air threat and to conduct support operations. A
major strength of the TAOM system is its modularity. The
system is modular in design with the basic element consisting
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Figure 19 TAOM Expanded View [Ref. 48]
necessary communication and data link equipment to conduct
limited stand alone operations. The TAOM is also designed for
rapid installation requiring approximately one hour for a
single TAOM to become operational. However, the TAOM system
is an integrated lattice of physically separated modules
connected by fiber optic cables. Ideally, the system will
consist of four identical interconnected modules requiring
approximately two hours to become operational. Removing one
module or element from within a module from the system reduces
the overall system capacity but not its capability. [Ref.
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Figure 20 Systems Capacities [Ref. 48]
The TAOM will provide the MAGTF commander increased
operational capability and versatility. It will provide him
with a highly reliable, mobile and fully interoperable air
command and control system with increased automation
capabilities. Figure 21 provides a comparison between the
TAOM and the older TAOC system. The TAOM system is a much
needed and welcomed addition to the MACCS.
E . SUMMARY
This chapter has reviewed several new C3 systems and the
capabilities that they will bring to the commanders they
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Figure 21 System Comparisons [Ref. 48]
support. ACDS provides enhanced graphics, displays for
tactical data and vastly improved computer capabilities that
together aid the commander and his ability to make and enact
decisions.
Copernicus is a far reaching proposal for a C 3 system that
would help automate the functions of the Space and Electronic
Warfare Commander (SEWC) in his job of integrating non-organic
intelligence with organic tactical data and its distribution
throughout the Battle Force. This is a far reaching proposal
that will take many years of research and development before
the complete operational system is deployed.
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The ATACC greatly enhances the TACC's capabilities with
automation of almost all functions and greatly increases the
mobility with the use of standard modular units. The TAOM
replaces the AN/TYQ-2 TAOC system with state of the art
automated systems. The mobility of the system is enhanced by
its placement within standard modules and has the ability to
link with other modules via fiber optic cables.
All of these systems are attempting to provide the
commander with accurate and highly detailed information in a
timely fashion which he can use to accomplish the assigned
mission. The next chapter reviews weapon systems that are
being studied for future use by the military. The ability of
a commander to engage hostile targets at greater distances or
with weapons that have increased capabilities can have a
profound affect on his decision making process.
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VIII. FUTURE WEAPON SYSTEMS
A. AIRBORNE WEAPON SYSTEMS
The future of naval aviation for the USN and USMC is
anything but clear during the drawdown of the 1990 's. This
section does not attempt to predict the future. It does,
however, attempt to generally describe those systems that are
currently under development.
L F-14D TOMCAT
The F-14D is a further modification of the F-14B.
This version of the TOMCAT retains the engines of the F-14B,
but replaces almost 60 percent of the analog avionics suite.
These systems are replaced with modern, effective and easily
maintained digital avionics. The AWG-9 Fire Control System
(FCS) is replaced with an APG-71 that has mono-pulse angle
tracking, digital scan control, target identification, raid
assessment capabilities, and improved Electronic Counter
Countermeasures (ECCM) . Other improvements include a digital
Inertial Navigation System (INS) , a new computer and stores
management system, and improved Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) and
Heads Up Display (HUD) displays for the pilot and Radar
Intercept Officer (RIO) . It is planned for the F-14D to carry
the Advanced Air-to-Air Missile (AAAM) if it replaces the
PHOENIX. [Ref. 30:p. 91]
136
2. F/A-18C/D
The F/A-18C/D is a proven multi-mission aircraft. In
Operation Desert Shield, the F-18 flew both carrier and land
based combat air patrol and fleet defense fighter missions to
suppress enemy air defenses and delivery weapons throughout
Iraq. [Ref. 34] It was used in a vast array of missions
effectively. On one mission during the Gulf War, F-18s
successfully placed bombs on target and effectively killed two
MIG's. Because of its proven performance and versatility, the
U.S. has conducted studies on how to further enhance the
HORNET'S capabilities and performance. [Ref. 35]
There are over 2 new technological improvement
programs for the F/A-18C/D but with today's budgetary
constraints, it is difficult to predict which ones will be
funded and eventually implemented. One of the more
significant upgrades is the APG-73 radar. The development
portion of this program has been funded. This radar will
provide more speed and memory. It will also have provisions
for follow-on improvements. The F-18 will also be fitted with
an advanced Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) for air to air
operations. Other scheduled improvements include engine
upgrades and reconnaissance. [Ref. 35]
3. F/A-18E/F HORNET
The F/A-18E/F originated from a study that was
initiated by then Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger in
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1987. Mr. Weinberger had foreseen that future aircraft
procurement such as the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) would
not be available in the late 1990' s and early 21st century in
order to combat foreseen threats of this era. He directed the
Secretary of the Navy to study a derivative of the F/A-18
which would serve the needs of the Navy/USMC until advanced
aircraft such as the AX or ATF enters service. The F/A-18E/F
is the result of this study. [Ref. 35]
The F/A-18E is the single seat future version of
tomorrow's strike fighter. The aircraft is considerably
larger than its predecessor but retains the same basic shape
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The fuselage has been extended and the wing is 25%
larger. This larger airframe allows the HORNET to increase
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its internal fuel capacity by 28% which is equivalent to an
additional 3,000 pounds. In addition, the F/A-18E will have
the option of carrying 480 pounds of external fuel tanks which
will increase its combat radius even further. This
improvement is welcomed by critics who claim the F-18 has a
limited on-station time. This F-18 will be fitted with a
derivative of the current F404 engine which will provide a
combined thrust of 44,000 pounds. The larger wing has
provided for an additional two weapon stations which increases
the F-18 payload and versatility. Figure 23 depicts where
these two new weapon stations are located. [Ref. 35]
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Figure 23 Weapon Station [Ref. 35]
The F/A-18E will provide tactical Navy and Marine Corp
aviation with an affordable, more capable aircraft. Figure 24
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Figure 24 F18 Comparison
to the F/A-18C. One major advantage, especially in this
declining budget era is that 90% of the F/A-18E's weapon
systems and avionics are essentially unchanged. This reduces
cost while still providing an improved aircraft with excellent
performance. The F/A-18F is the designator for the two seat
version of the F/A-18E with essentially the same
characteristics. [Ref. 35]
4. AV-8B HARRIER II PLUS
The AV-8B PLUS is an enhanced version of the AV-8B
incorporating the Hughes all-weather APG-65 multi-mode radar
system that is currently used by the F-18. The addition of
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the radar system increases the operational capability of the
AV-8B. The AV-8B PLUS will achieve stand-off air defense by
incorporating beyond visual range guided weapons which may
include SPARROW and Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile
(AMRAAM) missiles. [Ref. 36]
The AV-8B PLUS will also be fitted with the F402-RR-
408 engine which will provide increased thrust. These
capabilities will increase the AV-8B's flexibility and
operational effectiveness. [Ref. 36]
5. EA-6B ADVCAP PROWLER
This version of the PROWLER is designed around an
entirely new Receiver Processor Group (RPG) and the ALQ-149
jamming system combined with an advanced version of the ALQ-
99. The new system will allow the PROWLERS to respond to the
improvements of threat radars over the last ten years. This
includes capabilities to overcome coded pulses, spot jamming
and pulse to pulse frequency agility. The ALQ-149 system will
also have an enhanced capability to counter command and
control communications. The new system evenly divides the
work load among the three Electronic Countermeasures (ECM)
officers on board so that none are underutilized. Each of
their stations have been improved so that all three stations




a. Advanced Air-to-Air Missile (AAAM)
The Advanced Air-to-Air Missile is designed to
replace the PHOENIX missile in the Outer Air Battle (OAB)
.
The Navy is looking for a smaller and more capable AAM than
the PHOENIX. It is hoped that the AAAM will be small enough
(and weigh less) so that the TOMCAT can land with eight
onboard instead of its present limitation of four PHOENIX
missiles. This missile will also be designed to intercept
crossing and violently maneuvering targets out to 100 nm from
the launching TOMCAT. Two separate teams are currently
working on demonstration and validation contracts from the DOD
for the AAAM. [Ref. 23:p. 416]
b. AIM-120A AMRAAM
The Advance Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile
(AMRAAM) is intended to replace the SPARROW missile. The most
advanced feature of this missile is that it is a fire and
forget missile. It is essentially a mini-PHOENIX. The AMRAAM
is launched towards the predicted intercept point of a
designated target. Data link information allows the missile
to adjust its course to overcome maneuvers by the target.
When the missile is near enough to the target it activates an
X-band pulse-doppler seeker to home on the target by itself.
To increase its range and kinematic energy it is powered by a
boost-sustain motor vice the boost-glide motor of the SPARROW.
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The AIM-120A allows a pilot to engage multiple targets at one
time. [Ref. 23:p. 417]
B. SEA-BASED WEAPON SYSTEMS
1. New Threat Upgrade (NTU)
The NTU modification is an extremely important system
that is being added to almost all large AAW surface combatants
that are not AEGIS equipped. This system greatly increases
the sensor, computer and weapon systems capabilities to engage
Antiship Missiles (ASMs) and aircraft into the century. [Ref.
33:p. 49]
a . Sensors
The normal suite of SPS-48 and SPS-49 air search
radars are maintained, however, they have been greatly
improved upon. The SPS-4 8E is the standard version for NTU.
This version doubles the effective radiated power, reduces
sidelobes to increase ECCM, increases receiver sensitivity,
and extends maximum angle coverage to 65 degrees above the
ship. Additionally, reliability and ease of operation have
been vastly improved. Overall, part count has been reduced by
50 percent. [Ref. 23:pp. 332-333]
The SPS-49 (V) 5, likewise, has been much improved.
This version employs digital pulse-doppler processing to
reject clutter, has coherent sidelobe canceling and upspotting
capability to increase ECCM, and increased peak power out.
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The radar's reliability and ease of operation have also been
improved. [Ref. 23:p. 333-334]
In addition to the radar improvements, a new
system has been installed with NTU that allows for the two
separate radars to operate together as if they were a single
radar. The SYS-2 Integrated Automatic Detection-and Tracking
(IADT) system automatically receives the data from both
radars, compares them and then automatically correlates all
mutual tracks to produce a single air picture. Additionally,
it automatically feeds this data to the Combat Direction
System (CDS) for weapons control and Naval Tactical Data
System (NTDS) Link 11 without human intervention. This allows
for the near elimination of false or dual tracks and manual
entry errors and delays to Link 11. [Ref. 33 :p. 54]
Although the actual range of detection has not
increased with NTU, the probability of detection and continued
tracking of multiple air targets in an extremely hostile
jamming and chaff environment have increased greatly.
Jb . Weapons
All of the above improvements are nice, but do not
help much if you do not have a weapon that can engage a target
at these long ranges. The SM-2 BLK II series of Surface-to-
Air Missiles (SAMs) are designed to do just that. With their
improved software and booster, the Extended Range (ER) version
can engage targets out to 115 nm and up to 100,000 ft.
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Additionally, for larger bomber-size targets, they are able to
engage, under certain conditions, up to the range limits of
the fire control radars. Likewise, the MR missiles, can
engage out to 90 nm and up to 100,000 ft or for bomber-size
targets, under certain conditions, out to the range limits of
the fire control radar. [Ref. 23 :p. 404]
2. Ship Weapons
a. Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs)
(1) Standard Missile Block III and IV. The SM
continues to be upgraded to increase its performance in the
long range air battle as well as the low altitude intercept.
As mentioned previously, the only major difference between the
ER and MR version of this missile are the range limitations
imposed by the different boosters. The block modifications
for either type have the same capabilities for intercepting
targets. The BLK III introduces an improved low altitude fuse
for intercepting targets just above the water. Missiles with
BLK IIIA contain a new warhead and further refinements for low
altitude intercepts. The BLK IIIB incorporates an additional
Infrared (IR) seeker to improve target discrimination over the
water and in jamming and chaff environments. [Ref. 23 :p. 404]
SM-2 BLK IV has been designed specifically for
vertical launching. This version adds a short finless booster
to the normal SM-2MR missile so that an AEGIS Vertical Launch
System (VLS) ship can obtain engagements closer to the ER
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ranges listed above. These missiles are also unofficially
know as SM-2 AEGIS ER. [Ref. 23 :p. 404]
(2) RIM-116A RAM. The Rolling Airframe Missile
(RAM) is a new point defense missile that may replace or
compliment both the SEA SPARROW and PHALANX. It is designed
to be a fire and forget weapon. It can launch on either an IR
signature, or it can home on the emission of an active radar,
much like an Antiradiation Missile (ARM) . RAM combines a
SIDEWINDER motor, warhead, and fuse, a STINGER infrared
seeker, and a two antenna Radar Frequency (RF) seeker.
Several different launchers are being considered for the RAM.
A RAM II version with increased sensitivity for both IR and RF
homing is under development. [Ref. 23:pp. 400-401]
b . Guns
(1) 20 MM MK15 CIWS BLK 1. This version of the
PHALANX has many improvements over the original version. It
carries 50 percent more ready service ammunition, increases
search-elevation coverage, has better reliability and ease of
operation, and larger velocity engagement window of in bound
targets. BLK 1, Baseline 1 adds pneumatic gun drive which
increases firing rate to 4,500 rounds per minute. MK15 CIWS
BLK 2 is currently under development and will most likely have
an increased caliber gun. This development is also known as
"CIWS 2000". [Ref. 23:p. 468]
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c. Countermeasures
(1) SLQ-32 (V)4 and 5. The SLQ(V)4 is to replace
the SLQ-17 aboard aircraft carriers. (V) 4 employs fiber
optics to reduce interference from external sources. This
system also has a digital memory for faster threat evaluation.
It uses two computers to control the entire system. Each
computer is located near a transmitter/receiver group. [Ref.
23:pp. 530-531]
d. Research and Development
There are many "black" programs underway to
develop new systems. They range from chemical lasers and
directed energy weapons to electro-magnetic guns. Each of
these programs are under critical review with the reduced DOD
budgets for the 1990' s. It very likely that few will survive
since most third world nations do not have a threat that
requires their immediate use.
C. LAND BASED WEAPON SYSTEMS
1. Point Defense
a. Light Armored Vehicle Air Defense (LAV-AD)
The U.S. Marine Corps presently does not have a
mobile air defense weapon system and relies on the man
portable STINGER and Improved HAWK (I -HAWK) Surface to Air
Missile (SAM) to fulfill its air defense requirements. The
primary role of the LAV-AD is to engage helicopter and fixed-
winged aircraft with a secondary role of engaging ground
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targets using a cannon. The HYDRA-70 rockets which were
intended for engaging ground targets have been deleted from
the LAV-AD requirements. [Ref. 39: p. 98]
Prior to deciding on an air defense system, the
Marine Corps evaluated five possible solutions to meet the
LAV-AD requirements. These are as follows:
1. A base line system consisting of a standard LAV-AD
equipped with the McDonnell Douglas helicopters 25 MM chain
gun and carrying two man stinger SAM teams.
2. The basic LAV-25 modified to carry STINGER SAM pods and
equipped with a narrow field of view FLIR system.
3. LAV with new turret mounting for British Aerospace Rapier
SAMs and a millimeter wave radar.
4. LAV with Oerlikon-Buhrle Air Defense Anti-Tank System
(ADATS) which at the time had not been adopted by the U.S.
Army.
5. LAV with General Electric GAU-12/U 25MM gatling gun,
STINGERS and HYDRA-70 rockets with growth potential. [Ref.
39:p. 98]
The U.S. Army Tank Automotive Command accepted two
bids for an air defense version of the LAV. One bid was from
FMC Corporation and the other from General Electric Company.
(1) FMC LAV-AD. FMC version of the LAV will
consist of a two-man power-operated turret armed with four
General Dynamics SITNGER SAMs, and a McDonnell Douglas
Helicopters M242 25 mm chain gun. The electric turret will be
built by Cadillac Gage which can traverse a full 360 degrees
and elevate from -8 to +65 degrees. The U.S. Marine Corps
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presently has the M242 in service installed on the LAV-25.
The fire control system will be mounted on the rear of the
turret which houses the primary sight with two fields of view,
Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) and television. The
magnification of the FLIR is 2 . 67x and 8x. The magnification
of the day TV is 4x and 12x. The fire control system will
include a multi-mode automatic tracker and a laser range
finder with two video displays. Two backup sights will be
boresighted to the weapons. The total weapon loadout will
consist of 12 STINGER missiles, 16 smoke grenades and 990 25
mm rounds. The vehicle will also be fitted with a land
navigation system. [Ref. 39:p. 99]
(2) General Electric LAV-AD. The General Electric
system is based on the Blazer two-man power-operated turret
which was developed as a private venture by the Armament
Systems department of GE Aerospace. The Blazer will be armed
with the GA-12/U 25 mm gatling gun and four STINGER SAMs. The
GA-12/U 25 mm gatling gun is already in service used by the
U.S. Marine Corps McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier. This gun,
as opposed to the M242, has five barrels and can shoot at a
firing rate of 1800 rounds per minute. Each vehicle will also
be fitted with a 7.62mm machine gun and two pods of four
electrically operated smoke dischargers. [Ref. 39:p. 99]
The combat weight of the LAV-AD, which
includes the crew and ammunition, will be approximately
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29,0001bs. The LAV-AD provides logistics advantages since it
can be transported via C-130, C-141, C-5 and the CH-53E
helicopter. The turret is capable of traversing a full 360
degrees with powered weapon elevation from -8 to +65 degrees.
The LAV-AD uses Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) integrated
with a TV for primary target engagement. The GE LAV-AD will
have a crew of three which is composed of a driver, gunner and
commander and will be able to fire on the move. Although not
a present requirement by the Marine Corps, the GE LAV-AD will
keep the HYDRA-70 rockets as an option. [Ref. 39 :p. 99]
2. Area Defense
a. Improved HAWK (IHAWK)
There are several programs in progress which are
trying to further develop and exploit the HAWK system. The
primary upgrade program for the HAWK system is the HAWK
Mobility, Survivability and Enhancement (HMSE) program. The
program goal is essentially to improve the system's mobility.
This will include a reduced emplacement time and march order
time. [Ref. 39:p. 277]
In addition, there is a HAWK PIP phase IV and V
designed to further enhance HAWK ' s capability well into the
22nd century. With the defense cut backs, it is difficult to
predict what follow on improvements will actually occur.
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b . PATRIOT
The PATRIOT is an effective combat proven system.
Although HAWK presently provides adequate medium range air
defense, the PATRIOT system should be considered as a future
weapons system that can be jointly procured in order to reduce
cost. PATRIOT can either replace or augment HAWK, especially
in the medium to high altitude regime.
D. SUMMARY
This chapter has reviewed the weapon systems that are
currently being studied for military use. These weapon
systems can lead to a change in doctrine as they embrace new
technologies that allow engagement of hostile aircraft in ways
that before were only imagined. A prime example of this is
the AMRAAM. The ability to use a long range fire and forget
AAM could lead to a drastic change in the way that aircraft
target and engage enemy aircraft. This in turn can lead to a
change in the way a commander makes his decisions and the
paradigm that he is working in.
The following chapter brings together the findings of the
various chapters of the thesis. These findings are used to
make recommendations for future paradigms in the conduct of
amphibious operations.
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IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. SUMMARY
The success of an amphibious operation depends on the
smooth functioning of an array of warfare specialties.
(It) depends on the orchestrated application of virtually
the entire array of naval power. . . (including) antiair and
missile warfare, close air support, defense against
missile boats, naval gunfire support and mine
countermeasures. [Ref. 4 9 p. 394]
A problem exists in that senior naval tacticians do not
agree on how to best command this array of naval power during
amphibious operations. For over a decade, the Navy has
employed the Command and Control (C 2 ) concept of Composite
Warfare Commander (CWC) . This concept is designed to ensure
task force survivability in a multi-threat environment which
involves reduced reaction times. [Ref. 41 p. 3-4]
Amphibious doctrine has evolved from lessons learned from
two world wars and the Korean War. Current amphibious
doctrine has incorporated the CWC concept. Commander
Amphibious Task Force (CATF) has his own CWC that works
directly for him. There have been numerous Non-combatant
Evacuation Operations (NEOs) conducted at the Marine
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) level that have been well executed
using the current amphibious doctrine.
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These seem to be successful because all C3 within the
Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) were integrated within the
CATF's CWC. However, once an operation goes beyond the size
of the standard deployed MEU, C3 problems grow greatly,
especially for Antiair Warfare (AAW) . Current Navy doctrine
calls for the establishment of two separate CWCs: one for the
Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) , which would normally also have
the overall Of f icer-in-Tactical Command (OTC) embarked, and
one for the CATF. [Ref. 13:pp. 9-10 - 9-12]
Protection of the CVBG has seemingly taken precedence over
the protection of an Amphibious Task Force (ATF) . This leads
to an inappropriate division of available assets for the
protection of both the CVBG and the ATF.
As long as CATF is designated by an Initiating Directive,
he has the authority he needs to obtain the supporting assets
reguired from the CVBG to accomplish the mission and tactical
control of all friendly assets within the AOA. If a CATF is
not designated, it can lead to confusing C2 during the
operation. For example, during Operation URGENT FURY,
...there was no Initiating Directive, CATF was never
designated, an AOA was not established, and the amphibious
force commander (CAPT Erie) was not given tactical command
of the forces reguired to effectively accomplish his
mission. For instance, CAPT Erie never had tactical
command of the naval gunfire ships and the supporting
commander could reassign those ships to another mission at
any time. This situation was of particular significance
to the Army and Marine forces ashore whose lives and
mission depend heavily on receiving fire support
immediately upon reguest. [Ref. 41:pp. 12-13]
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At the heart of a coordinated AAW battle is the Tactical
Data Information Link (TADIL) . The various TADILs provide the
means to share tactical data between the various C 3 systems.
Unfortunately, not all C3 systems can operate on all TADILs or
exchange data between them. This may lead to a problem of
interoperability between the assets of a Battle Force and the
accomplishment of the mission. It also leads to a very
complicated effort to maintain an integrated AAW picture as
depicted in Figure 13. Currently, there are efforts to
combine the functions of the various existing TADILs into a
single datalink called TADIL-J. This proposed datalink is be
used by the U.S. Armed Forces.
C 3 systems and TADILs aid a commander in effectively
employing his weapons systems. The Navy and Marine Corps
possess an array of modern weaponry. They are continuously
upgrading and modernizing these systems to meet the expected
threat. This provides the commander flexibility in his
decision making to counter the threat and accomplish the
mission. The advent of new weaponry can lead to new
capabilities and tactics that support a change in doctrine.
Currently, there is no set doctrine for the AMRAAM and its
long range fire and forget capabilities. The proposal of the
Joint Engagement Zone (JEZ) concept is an example of an
attempt to change tactics to exploit the capability of modern
weapon systems.
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The lack of particular weapon systems must also be taken
into account by a commander. The Marine Corp has no medium-
to-high altitude Surface to Air Missile (SAM) capability. It
currently relies on either aviation assets or offshore Navy
ships to provide AAW protection in this region. If neither of
these assets are immediately available, a commander may
suddenly find himself in a dire situation.
Due to advances in C3 and weapon systems, senior naval
tacticians have proposed changes in the paradigms for
amphibious operations. There are currently two proposals to
modify the amphibious doctrine in different ways. Both
proposals are described in Chapter VI and recommendations for
them are discussed in the conclusions section.
B. CONCLUSIONS
lo CATF, CWC, and Amphibious Doctrine
TACMEMOs and subsequent doctrine that are written solely
on the basis of the seniority of the players in peacetime
are doomed to failure; either of themselves or the forces
attempting to use them in a war. [Ref. 50 :p. 2]
Commander Third Fleet (COMTHIRDFLT) TACMEMO PZ1010-1-
88 had several major differences with doctrinal issues
discussed in Joint Pub 3-02 that are considered indispensable
to the success of an amphibious operation. Doctrinal issues
such as CATF and Commander Landing Force (CLF) being
collocated are essential for the success of an amphibious
operation. COMTHIRDFLT TACMEMO PZ1010-1-88/91 , as proposed,
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is not workable. As quoted from an East Coast amphibious
group commander's point paper, the TACMEMO is unworkable for
the following reasons:
a. The TACMEMO is contrary to the COMSECONDFLT Fighting
Instruction which provides for CATF as a battle group
commander and CWC in the AOA.
b. CATF should be responsible for his own defense and not
subject to the priorities of another flag officer.
c. CATF collocated with CLF is in the best position to
direct the employment of all forces assigned and must have
instantaneous response from the support force [Ref . 50: p.
2-4]
Eliminating the term CATF and the authority invested
in him via the Initiating Directive places amphibious warfare
in a secondary role in situations where the primary mission of
the naval force is to establish a landing force ashore in a
hostile or potentially hostile environment. This notion was
opposed by both amphibious and CVBG commanders. [Ref. 41:p.
3-4]
The TACMEMO inserts another level of command that is
not necessary.
The establishment of an OTC between the amphibious warfare
commander (CATF) and the common superior (FLTCDR) inserts
an unnecessary level of command between the officer
responsible for accomplishing the mission and the fleet
commander. [Ref. 50: p. 2]
Amphibious and AAW doctrine has evolved into its
present form from many years of lessons learned. Doctrine
does not attempt to prescribe how to conduct operations. It
provides a foundation based on time-proven principles and
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ideas from many professionals who used the doctrine in past
campaigns. [Ref. 41: p. 14]
It is recommended that the proposed doctrinal changes
in this TACMEMO not be adopted.
2. Amphibious Defense Zone Coordinator (ADZC)
The ADZC paradigm put forth in Commander Surface
Warfare Development Group TACMEMO PZ 3010-1-88 will soon be
upgraded to TACNOTE PZ 3010-1-92 [Ref. 51]. The object of
this doctrine is to combine the overall AAW picture of the
Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) and the Amphibious Task Force
(ATF) such that the air defense of each is a subset of an
overall coordinated AAW problem instead of the current
doctrine of a separate air defense problem for each. This
proposal does not alter the overall authority of the CATF, and
provides a much more comprehensive defense of the AOA.
Additionally, it provides a more direct avenue to request air
assets from the Air Resource Element Coordinator (AREC) to
assist in the defense in the AOA. Unfortunately, this TACMEMO
does not include the integration of the Joint Force Air
Component Commander (JFACC) within the overall AAW
coordination effort.
It is recommended that this concept be tested using a
series of games and simulations to test its validity. Upon
successful completion of the games, the concept should be
tested in an exercise of enough size and scope, especially
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with regard to the integration of a JFACC and the AREC, to
determine if the proposed change in paradigm is viable.
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